Indian Law and Jurisprudence

Offence

Directions: Some words in the news item below have been highlighted. Select the best contextual meaning of the related words.

A company’s failure to prevent bribery is likely to be a punishable offence as the government proposes to amend the prevention of Corruption Act to include bribing gives as much as those who receive it, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said on Wednesday while addressing the annual conference of the Central Bureau of Investigation and the State Anti-Corruption Bureaus.

Amend

Directions: Some words in the news item below have been highlighted. Select the best contextual meaning of the related words.

A company’s failure to prevent bribery is likely to be a punishable offence as the government proposes to amend the prevention of Corruption Act to include bribing gives as much as those who receive it, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said on Wednesday while addressing the annual conference of the Central Bureau of Investigation and the State Anti-Corruption Bureaus.

Which of the following can be inferred from the passage?

I. The S.R. Bommai case judgement acted as a salutary check against the misuse of Art 356. II. The possibility of judicial review of the imposition of Art 356 deterred the use of the article for narrow political ends. III. State governments cannot be dismissed under any condition if they have majority in the assembly.

Directions: Read the following passage and then answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – III

The broad consensus that emerged at the Inter-State Council meeting over what is arguably the Constitution's most contentious provision — Article 356 — is a most welcome thing. The spirit of cooperative federalism has raised the hope of a constitutional amendment that will build safeguards into this emergency provision to prevent its misuse. Article 356 gives the Centre the power to take over the functions of a State Government in the event of a failure of the constitutional machinery in that State. However, the history of its use clearly reveals that it was invoked more often to fix politically inconvenient State Governments, precipitate fresh elections and for other reasons that have no relevance to the purpose of the Article.

In recent years, the judgment in the Bommai case has served as a salutary check — and indeed bar — against such misuse. The Court's ruling that the Centre cannot dissolve State legislatures unless the proclamation under Article 356 (1) is approved by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha has served as an effective restraint during a period when no party or combination of parties has enjoyed a majority in both Houses of Parliament. This pronouncement has deterred the use of the Article for narrow, political ends. Between 1950 and 1994, when the Bommai judgment was delivered, Article 356 was used on more than 90 occasions. In many cases, State Governments were dismissed even when they enjoyed a majority in the Assembly and in other cases, without being given an opportunity to prove their strength on the floor of the House.

Among other things, such an amendment must ensure that, if used at all, the recourse to Article 356 must be a last resort — one that is embraced after exhausting the options provided by other Articles in the Constitution such as 256, 257 and, more importantly, 355. The suggestion that the Governor's report recommending President's Rule should be in the nature of a speaking order is virtually identical to the recommendation made by the NCRWC. This was that such a report should contain a precise and clear statement of all the material facts and grounds, on the basis of which the President may satisfy himself as to the existence or otherwise of the situation contemplated in Article 356. Like some other emergency provisions in the Constitution, Article 356 was introduced as an extraordinary safeguard, not something that is invoked in non-extreme circumstances. During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar even hoped it would be a dead letter, something that would never be called into operation. The purpose of the proposed constitutional amendment should be to ensure that this democratic vision of cooperative federalism comes true, however late in the day.

Which of the following cannot be inferred from the passage that

1. the CVC Bill will be passed and the Directive will be challenged in the court
2. the CVC Bill will be passed but the Directive will never be challenged in the court
3. the CVC Bill will fail in the lower house
4. if the CVC Bill is passed, there is a great probability that it will be challenged in the court
   

Directions: Read the following passage and then answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – II

There was some fierce criticism of the Central Vigilance Commission Bill before it was passed in the Rajya Sabha, thus paving the way for its enactment. Unfortunately, there was not enough. More than one provision in the Bill — which gives the office of the CVC a statutory status and broad superintendence over the Central Bureau of Investigation — may deserve to be critically examined. The introduction of one clause deserves to be roundly condemned. What Section 6A does is to restore the so-called `Single Directive', an iniquitous rule or guideline that was explicitly and unambiguously quashed by the Supreme Court. Under the Single Directive, it was mandatory for the CBI to secure the prior approval of the Central Government before launching an investigation into a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act if the allegations related to an official of the rank of Joint Secretary or higher. The Supreme Court in the Vineet Narain/Jain hawala judgment of 1997 struck down the Directive. Every person accused of committing the same offence is to be dealt with in the same manner..., the Court had observed when striking down the Directive.

Against this background, the very presence of section 6A in the CVC Bill is mischievous. It is particularly shocking when one considers that an earlier bid to smuggle the Directive into the CVC ordinance had met with grave judicial disapproval. This eventually resulted in the ordinance being amended, with the offending provision thrown out. It is mystifying why, having been bitten once, the Government is not shy of daring the Supreme Court again. What the resurfacing of the Directive suggests is that, when it comes to issues where it has a vested interest, the higher bureaucracy can exercise an extraordinary influence over its political masters.

The much bigger issue of course is that the Directive can be, and has been, used to stymie the investigation of corruption cases. Since some of these cases involve a conspiratorial nexus between bureaucrats and politicians, many politicians clearly have a vested interest in keeping the Directive alive. The cynical manner in which such self-serving legal protection is perceived was evident during the debate on the CVC Bill. One of the issues discussed was this: when such protection existed for bureaucrats, why was there no such cover for MPs? The Supreme Court struck down the Directive on the grounds that it was discriminatory and that there was no reasonable basis for distinguishing between decision-making officers and other bureaucrats for the purpose of investigating an offence for which they were accused. After the Bill is formally enacted, it is virtually certain that the Directive will be challenged in Court. It never pays to speculate about the workings of the judicial mind, but there will be no surprise if the Directive is struck down, if the Government is taken sternly to task, and if the Court has the last laugh.

What is the main idea of the passage?

Directions: Read the following passage and then answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – II

There was some fierce criticism of the Central Vigilance Commission Bill before it was passed in the Rajya Sabha, thus paving the way for its enactment. Unfortunately, there was not enough. More than one provision in the Bill — which gives the office of the CVC a statutory status and broad superintendence over the Central Bureau of Investigation — may deserve to be critically examined. The introduction of one clause deserves to be roundly condemned. What Section 6A does is to restore the so-called `Single Directive', an iniquitous rule or guideline that was explicitly and unambiguously quashed by the Supreme Court. Under the Single Directive, it was mandatory for the CBI to secure the prior approval of the Central Government before launching an investigation into a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act if the allegations related to an official of the rank of Joint Secretary or higher. The Supreme Court in the Vineet Narain/Jain hawala judgment of 1997 struck down the Directive. Every person accused of committing the same offence is to be dealt with in the same manner..., the Court had observed when striking down the Directive.

Against this background, the very presence of section 6A in the CVC Bill is mischievous. It is particularly shocking when one considers that an earlier bid to smuggle the Directive into the CVC ordinance had met with grave judicial disapproval. This eventually resulted in the ordinance being amended, with the offending provision thrown out. It is mystifying why, having been bitten once, the Government is not shy of daring the Supreme Court again. What the resurfacing of the Directive suggests is that, when it comes to issues where it has a vested interest, the higher bureaucracy can exercise an extraordinary influence over its political masters.

The much bigger issue of course is that the Directive can be, and has been, used to stymie the investigation of corruption cases. Since some of these cases involve a conspiratorial nexus between bureaucrats and politicians, many politicians clearly have a vested interest in keeping the Directive alive. The cynical manner in which such self-serving legal protection is perceived was evident during the debate on the CVC Bill. One of the issues discussed was this: when such protection existed for bureaucrats, why was there no such cover for MPs? The Supreme Court struck down the Directive on the grounds that it was discriminatory and that there was no reasonable basis for distinguishing between decision-making officers and other bureaucrats for the purpose of investigating an offence for which they were accused. After the Bill is formally enacted, it is virtually certain that the Directive will be challenged in Court. It never pays to speculate about the workings of the judicial mind, but there will be no surprise if the Directive is struck down, if the Government is taken sternly to task, and if the Court has the last laugh.