Constitutions and Law

While referring to the Uniform Civil Code, the author uses the expression ‘the part of the constitution they seemingly venerate’. What does this suggest? (I) It suggests that all articles of the constitution are held with the same degree of esteem. (II) It suggests that the respect the politicians show to the constitution is not real or genuine. (III) It suggests that the Uniform Civil Code is the part of the same constitution which they publicly eulogize and venerate.

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

After India became independent, one angry citizen asked Nehru as to what the difference was between the regime they had overthrown and the one they had ushered in. That he was able to speak to the prime minister of the nation in this manner was the difference between the two regimes, Nehru replied, politely.
What Nehru said was the essence of democracy. In a democracy, one should be able to voice one’s concern on any matter without fear or favor. As long as this element is present, there is no danger to democracy.
After over half a century if we are able to give an affirmative answer to this question, we may claim to be on the right track. If not, something is definitely amiss. But mere expression of it is not enough unless it seems to have been heard where it was intended to be heard in the first place; and is not merely heard, but necessary remedial action is taken wherever and whenever feasible and desirable. In other words, in a democracy public opinion should matter without exception.

A kind of ennui appears to have gripped everyone. Lack of governance during the past six decades and the growing unconcern displayed by those at the helm and the failings of the various pillars of democracy have added to this ennui. Ordinary citizens are not just victims of neglect and unconcern, even the judiciary has been suffering from the same kind of neglect and unconcern. 
We are a nation of hypocrites. On one hand, we make a demonstration of our allegiance to the constitution, while on the other we keep trampling over it whenever it suits us. We have more than 400 Articles in our constitution (it began with 395 Articles and has steadily been growing in number). One thought that since all articles are the product of the same constitution, all of them would carry equal weight, or would at least have the same degree of importance. But no, that is not the position. Some articles continue to be treated with complete disregard. For instance, most of the articles under Part IV, especially 44, 45, 46, 47 and 49 remain as mere embellishments. Talk of the Uniform Civil Code for citizens, many politicians will be up in arms as if it was blasphemous to talk about it; as if it was not a part of the constitution they seemingly VENERATE.

When will the time be ripe? With the kind of politicians lurking around, it is anybody’s guess if the time will ever be ripe. Indeed many politicians in private admit that reservation has done a great deal of harm to the nation in as much as it kept merit from surfacing in full bloom. I do not know if reservation on the basis of caste is allowed in any part of the world. I also do not know if considerations other than merit (nepotism excepted) are of any consequence in any part of the world. Is it not self-condemnation of those who led the country this long and failed to meet the basic requirements of the people and the nation? These people have much to answer to for the present ills.

The fundamental issue that the author raises and sets at rest in this passage pertains to

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

That India and the United States of America have different experiences with constitution making is not in doubt. The US initially came into being as a consequence of Individual states joining the Union in a voluntary federation. The Republic of India, despite being a nominal ‘Union of States’, evolved as the successor regime of British India (minus the parts that made up Pakistan). To this was added the many hundred princely states whose rulers signed the instrument of Accession and were effortlessly subsumed into the new republic. With the states being regarded as mere administrative units, there was a basis to B.R.Ambedkar’s assertion in the constituent assembly that the Constitution did not acknowledge any right of secession.

The constitutional denial of secession is worth reiterating if only to set at rest the uninformed fear that the recent political battles over federalism are a precursor to the weakening and eventual disintegration of Indian Union. Admittedly this was a lurking fear in the first two decades after independence but following the creation of a national market, the rise in inter-state mobility and the unifying effects of the media, film industries and cricket, the fear of India falling apart has virtually become a non-issue. It would be preposterous to suggest that those at the forefront of the demand to review centre-state relations harbour separatist ambitions. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the recent political strains between the non-Congress ruled states and the Centre have not been accompanied by sectarian strains involving local people and outsiders.

The movement for more equitable federal relations has undergone a profound change since the last years of Indira Gandhi’s government. In those days, much of the controversy centred on the powers of the governor and the partisan use of Article 356 to dismiss state governments. It was primarily these political concerns that led to the appointment of the Sarkaria Commission to review the whole gamut of centre-state relations.
While many states continue to be unhappy with the Centre’s de facto veto over state legislation, it would be fair to say that the debate has shifted to the more pressing issue of fiscal powers. What has triggered this debate is India’s economic growth: the rapid growth of the country’s gross domestic product since the process of liberalization began in 1991. In the recent years, the gross tax revenues of the country as a whole have increased exponentially.

How does the comparison between India and US with regard to experiences on constitution making help the author in presenting his case?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

That India and the United States of America have different experiences with constitution making is not in doubt. The US initially came into being as a consequence of Individual states joining the Union in a voluntary federation. The Republic of India, despite being a nominal ‘Union of States’, evolved as the successor regime of British India (minus the parts that made up Pakistan). To this was added the many hundred princely states whose rulers signed the instrument of Accession and were effortlessly subsumed into the new republic. With the states being regarded as mere administrative units, there was a basis to B.R.Ambedkar’s assertion in the constituent assembly that the Constitution did not acknowledge any right of secession.

The constitutional denial of secession is worth reiterating if only to set at rest the uninformed fear that the recent political battles over federalism are a precursor to the weakening and eventual disintegration of Indian Union. Admittedly this was a lurking fear in the first two decades after independence but following the creation of a national market, the rise in inter-state mobility and the unifying effects of the media, film industries and cricket, the fear of India falling apart has virtually become a non-issue. It would be preposterous to suggest that those at the forefront of the demand to review centre-state relations harbour separatist ambitions. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the recent political strains between the non-Congress ruled states and the Centre have not been accompanied by sectarian strains involving local people and outsiders.

The movement for more equitable federal relations has undergone a profound change since the last years of Indira Gandhi’s government. In those days, much of the controversy centred on the powers of the governor and the partisan use of Article 356 to dismiss state governments. It was primarily these political concerns that led to the appointment of the Sarkaria Commission to review the whole gamut of centre-state relations.
While many states continue to be unhappy with the Centre’s de facto veto over state legislation, it would be fair to say that the debate has shifted to the more pressing issue of fiscal powers. What has triggered this debate is India’s economic growth: the rapid growth of the country’s gross domestic product since the process of liberalization began in 1991. In the recent years, the gross tax revenues of the country as a whole have increased exponentially.

What possible dangers does the author envisage when an institution becomes overzealous in asserting its privileges?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The most remarkable achievement in post-constitution India is the exercise of the power of the judicial review by the superior courts. So long as this power is wielded by the courts effectively and fearlessly, democracy will remain ensured in India and, with all its shortcomings, the Constitution will survive. The numerous applications for the constitutional writs before the High Courts and the Supreme Court and their results testify to the establishment in India of ‘limited government’, or, ‘the government of laws, not of men’, as they call it in the United States of America. The Supreme Court has well performed its task of protecting the rights of the individual against the executive, against oppressive legislations and even against the Legislature itself, when it becomes overzealous in asserting its privileges not only against the individual citizens but even against the judges.
At the same time, it should be observed that neither the guarantee of the Fundamental Rights nor its adjunct, — Judicial Review, — could have full play during the first quarter of a century of the working of our Constitution owning to their erosion by Proclamations of Emergency over a substantial period of time. It is true that the Emergency provisions are as much a part of the Constitution of India as any other, and that history has proved the need for such powers to meet extraordinary situations, but, broadly speaking, if the application of the Emergency provisions overshadows the other features of the Constitution, the balance between the ‘normal’ and ‘emergency’ provisions is palpably destroyed. Even, apart from Emergency, there has been an astounding erosion of Fundamental Rights owning to multiple amendments of the Constitution.
The means to prevent any such conflict between competing interests is to process all proposals for constitutional amendments through an expert and objective machinery, which would ensure the progressive adaptation of the Constitution to the Copernican changes in the social, economic and political background.

What, according to the passage, is the biggest concern of the author?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The most remarkable achievement in post-constitution India is the exercise of the power of the judicial review by the superior courts. So long as this power is wielded by the courts effectively and fearlessly, democracy will remain ensured in India and, with all its shortcomings, the Constitution will survive. The numerous applications for the constitutional writs before the High Courts and the Supreme Court and their results testify to the establishment in India of ‘limited government’, or, ‘the government of laws, not of men’, as they call it in the United States of America. The Supreme Court has well performed its task of protecting the rights of the individual against the executive, against oppressive legislations and even against the Legislature itself, when it becomes overzealous in asserting its privileges not only against the individual citizens but even against the judges.
At the same time, it should be observed that neither the guarantee of the Fundamental Rights nor its adjunct, — Judicial Review, — could have full play during the first quarter of a century of the working of our Constitution owning to their erosion by Proclamations of Emergency over a substantial period of time. It is true that the Emergency provisions are as much a part of the Constitution of India as any other, and that history has proved the need for such powers to meet extraordinary situations, but, broadly speaking, if the application of the Emergency provisions overshadows the other features of the Constitution, the balance between the ‘normal’ and ‘emergency’ provisions is palpably destroyed. Even, apart from Emergency, there has been an astounding erosion of Fundamental Rights owning to multiple amendments of the Constitution.
The means to prevent any such conflict between competing interests is to process all proposals for constitutional amendments through an expert and objective machinery, which would ensure the progressive adaptation of the Constitution to the Copernican changes in the social, economic and political background.

Reading of the passage leads to the conclusion that the author is of the view that

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The most remarkable achievement in post-constitution India is the exercise of the power of the judicial review by the superior courts. So long as this power is wielded by the courts effectively and fearlessly, democracy will remain ensured in India and, with all its shortcomings, the Constitution will survive. The numerous applications for the constitutional writs before the High Courts and the Supreme Court and their results testify to the establishment in India of ‘limited government’, or, ‘the government of laws, not of men’, as they call it in the United States of America. The Supreme Court has well performed its task of protecting the rights of the individual against the executive, against oppressive legislations and even against the Legislature itself, when it becomes overzealous in asserting its privileges not only against the individual citizens but even against the judges.
At the same time, it should be observed that neither the guarantee of the Fundamental Rights nor its adjunct, — Judicial Review, — could have full play during the first quarter of a century of the working of our Constitution owning to their erosion by Proclamations of Emergency over a substantial period of time. It is true that the Emergency provisions are as much a part of the Constitution of India as any other, and that history has proved the need for such powers to meet extraordinary situations, but, broadly speaking, if the application of the Emergency provisions overshadows the other features of the Constitution, the balance between the ‘normal’ and ‘emergency’ provisions is palpably destroyed. Even, apart from Emergency, there has been an astounding erosion of Fundamental Rights owning to multiple amendments of the Constitution.
The means to prevent any such conflict between competing interests is to process all proposals for constitutional amendments through an expert and objective machinery, which would ensure the progressive adaptation of the Constitution to the Copernican changes in the social, economic and political background.