Reading Comprehension

In a parliamentary democracy like India, ________________.

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The current phase or judicial intervention has often been termed judicial activism, but the Supreme Court has held the view that far from being an activist court, it has only tried to do what it should have done long ago. i.e., enforce the law. In the process if the corrupt come to grief or the executive is called to account for its acts of omission or commission, that is all to the good.

Because we have a written Constitution, the ultimate arbiter of whether laws have constitutional validity or whether the actions of the executive conform to the law will always be the courts. With this there can be no quarrel. When we look at the constitutional provisions for the establishment of the Supreme Court and its powers we find that the basic function of the courts is to adjudicate, which means to determine judicially in a matter in which there are conflicting opinions or adversaries in a case.

It is only Article 141 that confers on the Supreme Court a power which goes beyond adjudication and that is to declare a law that will be binding on all courts in India. The declaration of such a law can be through an interpretation of the existing law, or by a judgment that a particular law is ultra vires or by laying down guidelines of how courts will decide a matter where the law is silent or where there is a legal lacuna.

One example of this is a case which came before the then Chief Justice of India, Justice P. N. Bhagwati, relating to the quantum of compensation which should be paid to persons who had strayed on to an army firing range and sustained injury while trying to retrieve what they thought was an empty shell but which turned out to be live. Justice Bhagwati ruled that whereas there was no specific law governing such compensation, there were other –laws which lay down the guidelines of compensation to victims of motor accidents, rail accidents, air accidents, etc. He then fixed compensation at an amount more or less equivalent to what the law permitted in the case of an air accident. This judgement is now law for all courts.

That, by itself, does not mean that the power which vests in Parliament under Part V, chapter 2 of the Constitution to enact laws under lists I and 3 of the Seventh Schedule also vests in the Supreme Court under Article 141. Unless the court decides that the law itself is unconstitutional, it is bound by every law of Parliament and Stale Legislatures. This is the fine-tuning of separation of power in India between the legislature and the judiciary.

In all this where does the executive fit in? Parts V and VI of the Constitution make, a specific provision for the Union and the State executive that the executive power of the Union vests in the President, to be exercised by officers subordinate to him, and the executive power of each State vests in the Governor, to be exercised by officers subordinate to him. If we take legislation to be the responsibility of the legislatures and adjudication to be that of the judiciary, then the residuary function of implementing the laws and acting according to the policy of the Government is the responsibility of the executive. This is not a delegated or subordinate function - it is the constitutional responsibility of the executive.

Under Article 73 the Union has executive powers in all matters with respect to which Parliament has the power to make laws, just as under Article 162 the executive power of the State extends to all matters which fall within the legislative jurisdiction of the State Legislature. How the Government will exercise this executive power is determined by rules framed under Articles 77 and 166.

In a parliamentary democracy, because the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the legislature, it is the executive that takes the lead in legislation. Unless the executive supports a particular Bill there is almost no chance of its being enacted into law because it would not muster enough support in the House. It is the executive. Therefore, this is the initiator of legislature. It is the executive which prepares the annual statement of estimated receipts and expenditure under Articles 112 and 202 respectively, popularly known as the budget, and then pilots the discussion on grants, the Appropriation Bill, etc. which gives the Government the legislative sanction for incurring expenditure. It also places before Parliament appropriate proposals for taxation.

Just as there is a finely tuned balance between the legislature and the judiciary the executive also is subject to constitutional checks and balances. The biggest check is law itself and if any member of the executive violates it he is liable for action before a court of law. Then there is the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts, whereby the executive can be directed to desist from a particular course of action or, conversely, directed to perform a particular function. The legislature, to whom the Ministers are responsible, can call the Government to account through discussions, resolutions, adjournment motions, budget debates, questions, and no-confidence motions. If need be the legislature can even oust the Government. However, these checks and balances by themselves do not give the other organs of the State - the legislature and the judiciary - the power to interfere in the working of the executive or to place it in a subordinate position.

All matters relating to governance being the responsibility of the executive, there is no authority in India that can interfere with its day-to-day working. Let me try and illustrate this point. The postings and transfers of officers fall within the exclusive purview of the executive.

Provided that there is no arbitrariness in this, the courts cannot interfere. This means that the courts cannot decide that an extension should be given to the Director of CBI, that his subordinate officers should bypass him in an investigation or that a particular officer should be transferred to a particular place.

Unfortunately, this is precisely what the Supreme Court and the High Courts have been doing in a number of cases and a weak and pusillanimous Government has been surrendering in every case. The investigation of an offence may lead to a judicial process, but provided that the investigation is done according to law, the investigating agency is certainly within the supervisory control of the executive.

For the courts to order that the Government will not exercise its power of supervision and direction under Section 4 of the Police Act is an undue interference. For the Government to direct that before an investigation is undertaken into a particular case prior approval should be sought is perfectly valid, unless the law prohibits it. Nowhere in the world is the power of the police to investigate unfettered, except in a dictatorship, and the power to supervise, direct and control the police must vest in the executive. The courts may intervene only if the Government uses its power arbitrarily.

The executive has every right to decide how it will dispose of public property, provided that this is done according to a predetermined policy, clearly enunciated rules and in the public interest. Certainly it cannot be done to favour individuals or to cause pecuniary loss to the State.

When Ravi Shankar Shukla was Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh and the capital shifted from Nagpur to Bhopal, he ordered the construction of several thousand residential units for Government servants. An objection was raised in the Vidhan Sabha to the effect that the work was awarded to a consortium without inviting tenders. The Chief Minister stated that there was paucity of time, that he had ordered the sanction of the work and its award to the consortium and that no officer was to blame.

Seven years later one of his successors, D. P. Mishra, made a similar statement in the legislature when an objection was raised about resettling 25,000 East Pakistan refugees in a district, for which purpose only seven days were given to the local officials to prepare the camps. As the person in charge, I had invited no tenders but had completed the work in time. The Chief Minister fully supported me and no further questions were asked.

What, then, is the role of the executive in a democracy? First, foremost, it is to govern, to provide governance and to implement the provisions of the Constitution and the law. For that you need a political head of the executive who, like D. P. Mishra, could say "I ordered it and so it has been done". The present lot who masquerade as ministers neither have the capacity to govern, nor have the courage. Between them they have reduced our executive to a position of impotence and subordination.

Which among the following is not true about the proposed amendment of Art 356?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:
The broad consensus that emerged at the Inter–State Council meeting over what is arguably the Constitution's most contentious provision — Article 356 — is a most welcome thing. The spirit of cooperative federalism has raised the hope of a constitutional amendment that will build safeguards into this emergency provision to prevent its misuse. The Union Law Minister, Arun Jaitley's press briefing suggested that these safeguards will incorporate the essence of the Supreme Court's landmark 1994 judgment in the S.R. Bommai vs Union of India case and include recommendations made by bodies such as the Sarkaria Commission and the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC). Article 356 gives the Centre the power to take over the functions of a State Government in the event of a failure of the constitutional machinery in that State. However, the history of its use clearly reveals that it was invoked more often to fix politically inconvenient State Governments, precipitate fresh elections and for other reasons that have no relevance to the purpose of the Article.

In recent years, the judgment in the Bommai case has served as a salutary check — and indeed bar — against such misuse. The Court's ruling that the Centre cannot dissolve State legislatures unless the proclamation under Article 356 (1) is approved by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha has served as an effective restraint during a period when no party or combination of parties has enjoyed a majority in both Houses of Parliament. The Court also held that any such proclamation is open to judicial review to the extent of examining whether it was issued on the basis of relevant material or whether it was a mala fideexercise of power. This pronouncement has deterred the use of the Article for narrow, political ends. Between 1950 and 1994, when the Bommai judgment was delivered, Article 356 was used on more than 90 occasions. In many cases, State Governments were dismissed even when they enjoyed a majority in the Assembly and in other cases, without being given an opportunity to prove their strength on the floor of the House. Instances of such misuse have all but vanished in recent years, but it is important to strengthen and institutionalize the safeguards through a constitutional amendment.

Among other things, such an amendment must ensure that, if used at all, the recourse to Article 356 must be a last resort — one that is embraced after exhausting the options provided by other Articles in the Constitution such as 256, 257 and, more importantly, 355. Other measures, such as the condition that the Centre must formally communicate to a State the facts and reasons for proposing to bring it under President's Rule and give the State an opportunity to reply, are essentially intended to ensure that the proposed use of Article 356 is based on a rigorous method. Mr. Jaitley's suggestion that the Governor's report recommending President's Rule should be in the nature of a "speaking order" is virtually identical to the recommendation made by the NCRWC. This was that such a report should contain "a precise and clear statement of all the material facts and grounds, on the basis of which the President may satisfy himself as to the existence or otherwise of the situation contemplated in Article 356." Like some other emergency provisions in the Constitution, Article 356 was introduced as an extraordinary safeguard, not something that is invoked in non–extreme circumstances. During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar even hoped it would be a "dead letter," something that would "never be called into operation." The purpose of the proposed constitutional amendment should be to ensure that this democratic vision of cooperative federalism comes true, however late in the day.

The broad consensus that emerged at the Inter–State Council meeting over what is arguably the Constitution's most contentious provision — Article 356 — is a most welcome thing. The spirit of cooperative federalism has raised the hope of a constitutional amendment that will build safeguards into this emergency provision to prevent its misuse. The Union Law Minister, Arun Jaitley's press briefing suggested that these safeguards will incorporate the essence of the Supreme Court's landmark 1994 judgment in the S.R. Bommai vs Union of India case and include recommendations made by bodies such as the Sarkaria Commission and the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC). Article 356 gives the Centre the power to take over the functions of a State Government in the event of a failure of the constitutional machinery in that State. However, the history of its use clearly reveals that it was invoked more often to fix politically inconvenient State Governments, precipitate fresh elections and for other reasons that have no relevance to the purpose of the Article.

In recent years, the judgment in the Bommai case has served as a salutary check — and indeed bar — against such misuse. The Court's ruling that the Centre cannot dissolve State legislatures unless the proclamation under Article 356 (1) is approved by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha has served as an effective restraint during a period when no party or combination of parties has enjoyed a majority in both Houses of Parliament. The Court also held that any such proclamation is open to judicial review to the extent of examining whether it was issued on the basis of relevant material or whether it was a mala fideexercise of power. This pronouncement has deterred the use of the Article for narrow, political ends. Between 1950 and 1994, when the Bommai judgment was delivered, Article 356 was used on more than 90 occasions. In many cases, State Governments were dismissed even when they enjoyed a majority in the Assembly and in other cases, without being given an opportunity to prove their strength on the floor of the House. Instances of such misuse have all but vanished in recent years, but it is important to strengthen and institutionalize the safeguards through a constitutional amendment.

Among other things, such an amendment must ensure that, if used at all, the recourse to Article 356 must be a last resort — one that is embraced after exhausting the options provided by other Articles in the Constitution such as 256, 257 and, more importantly, 355. Other measures, such as the condition that the Centre must formally communicate to a State the facts and reasons for proposing to bring it under President's Rule and give the State an opportunity to reply, are essentially intended to ensure that the proposed use of Article 356 is based on a rigorous method. Mr. Jaitley's suggestion that the Governor's report recommending President's Rule should be in the nature of a "speaking order" is virtually identical to the recommendation made by the NCRWC. This was that such a report should contain "a precise and clear statement of all the material facts and grounds, on the basis of which the President may satisfy himself as to the existence or otherwise of the situation contemplated in Article 356." Like some other emergency provisions in the Constitution, Article 356 was introduced as an extraordinary safeguard, not something that is invoked in non–extreme circumstances. During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar even hoped it would be a "dead letter," something that would "never be called into operation." The purpose of the proposed constitutional amendment should be to ensure that this democratic vision of cooperative federalism comes true, however late in the day.

Which of the following can be inferred from the passage? I. The S.R. Bommai case judgement acted as a salutary check against the misuse of Art 356. II. The possibility judicial review of the imposition of Article 356 deterred the use of the article for narrow political ends. III. State governments cannot be dismissed under condition if they have majority in the assembly.

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:
The broad consensus that emerged at the Inter–State Council meeting over what is arguably the Constitution's most contentious provision — Article 356 — is a most welcome thing. The spirit of cooperative federalism has raised the hope of a constitutional amendment that will build safeguards into this emergency provision to prevent its misuse. The Union Law Minister, Arun Jaitley's press briefing suggested that these safeguards will incorporate the essence of the Supreme Court's landmark 1994 judgment in the S.R. Bommai vs Union of India case and include recommendations made by bodies such as the Sarkaria Commission and the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC). Article 356 gives the Centre the power to take over the functions of a State Government in the event of a failure of the constitutional machinery in that State. However, the history of its use clearly reveals that it was invoked more often to fix politically inconvenient State Governments, precipitate fresh elections and for other reasons that have no relevance to the purpose of the Article.

In recent years, the judgment in the Bommai case has served as a salutary check — and indeed bar — against such misuse. The Court's ruling that the Centre cannot dissolve State legislatures unless the proclamation under Article 356 (1) is approved by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha has served as an effective restraint during a period when no party or combination of parties has enjoyed a majority in both Houses of Parliament. The Court also held that any such proclamation is open to judicial review to the extent of examining whether it was issued on the basis of relevant material or whether it was a mala fideexercise of power. This pronouncement has deterred the use of the Article for narrow, political ends. Between 1950 and 1994, when the Bommai judgment was delivered, Article 356 was used on more than 90 occasions. In many cases, State Governments were dismissed even when they enjoyed a majority in the Assembly and in other cases, without being given an opportunity to prove their strength on the floor of the House. Instances of such misuse have all but vanished in recent years, but it is important to strengthen and institutionalize the safeguards through a constitutional amendment.

Among other things, such an amendment must ensure that, if used at all, the recourse to Article 356 must be a last resort — one that is embraced after exhausting the options provided by other Articles in the Constitution such as 256, 257 and, more importantly, 355. Other measures, such as the condition that the Centre must formally communicate to a State the facts and reasons for proposing to bring it under President's Rule and give the State an opportunity to reply, are essentially intended to ensure that the proposed use of Article 356 is based on a rigorous method. Mr. Jaitley's suggestion that the Governor's report recommending President's Rule should be in the nature of a "speaking order" is virtually identical to the recommendation made by the NCRWC. This was that such a report should contain "a precise and clear statement of all the material facts and grounds, on the basis of which the President may satisfy himself as to the existence or otherwise of the situation contemplated in Article 356." Like some other emergency provisions in the Constitution, Article 356 was introduced as an extraordinary safeguard, not something that is invoked in non–extreme circumstances. During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar even hoped it would be a "dead letter," something that would "never be called into operation." The purpose of the proposed constitutional amendment should be to ensure that this democratic vision of cooperative federalism comes true, however late in the day.

The broad consensus that emerged at the Inter–State Council meeting over what is arguably the Constitution's most contentious provision — Article 356 — is a most welcome thing. The spirit of cooperative federalism has raised the hope of a constitutional amendment that will build safeguards into this emergency provision to prevent its misuse. The Union Law Minister, Arun Jaitley's press briefing suggested that these safeguards will incorporate the essence of the Supreme Court's landmark 1994 judgment in the S.R. Bommai vs Union of India case and include recommendations made by bodies such as the Sarkaria Commission and the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC). Article 356 gives the Centre the power to take over the functions of a State Government in the event of a failure of the constitutional machinery in that State. However, the history of its use clearly reveals that it was invoked more often to fix politically inconvenient State Governments, precipitate fresh elections and for other reasons that have no relevance to the purpose of the Article.

In recent years, the judgment in the Bommai case has served as a salutary check — and indeed bar — against such misuse. The Court's ruling that the Centre cannot dissolve State legislatures unless the proclamation under Article 356 (1) is approved by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha has served as an effective restraint during a period when no party or combination of parties has enjoyed a majority in both Houses of Parliament. The Court also held that any such proclamation is open to judicial review to the extent of examining whether it was issued on the basis of relevant material or whether it was a mala fideexercise of power. This pronouncement has deterred the use of the Article for narrow, political ends. Between 1950 and 1994, when the Bommai judgment was delivered, Article 356 was used on more than 90 occasions. In many cases, State Governments were dismissed even when they enjoyed a majority in the Assembly and in other cases, without being given an opportunity to prove their strength on the floor of the House. Instances of such misuse have all but vanished in recent years, but it is important to strengthen and institutionalize the safeguards through a constitutional amendment.

Among other things, such an amendment must ensure that, if used at all, the recourse to Article 356 must be a last resort — one that is embraced after exhausting the options provided by other Articles in the Constitution such as 256, 257 and, more importantly, 355. Other measures, such as the condition that the Centre must formally communicate to a State the facts and reasons for proposing to bring it under President's Rule and give the State an opportunity to reply, are essentially intended to ensure that the proposed use of Article 356 is based on a rigorous method. Mr. Jaitley's suggestion that the Governor's report recommending President's Rule should be in the nature of a "speaking order" is virtually identical to the recommendation made by the NCRWC. This was that such a report should contain "a precise and clear statement of all the material facts and grounds, on the basis of which the President may satisfy himself as to the existence or otherwise of the situation contemplated in Article 356." Like some other emergency provisions in the Constitution, Article 356 was introduced as an extraordinary safeguard, not something that is invoked in non–extreme circumstances. During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar even hoped it would be a "dead letter," something that would "never be called into operation." The purpose of the proposed constitutional amendment should be to ensure that this democratic vision of cooperative federalism comes true, however late in the day.

From the passage, it can be inferred that _______________.

Directions: Read the passage and answer the question that follows:

Banks, trading companies, leasing companies and multinational corporations have currency convertibility risk even if they don’t currently attempt to quantify the risk on their balance sheets. Buyers and sellers of currency convertibility protection must not only have a feel for pricing credit derivatives, they must be economists with a penchant for econometrics. These are negotiated transactions. Price, terms, conditions, and size are all negotiated directly between counterparties. As there are so few real counterparties for this type of protection, the broker market is usually ineffective. It is much more effective to contact well–known counterparties in the credit derivatives market and negotiate the transactions and market levels directly. This is a supply and demand driven market, and prices vary from counterparty to counterparty. Sovereign whim can drive this market. Buyers of convertibility protection have a knock–in spot trade. The knock–in is independent of currency levels; sovereign dynamics trigger the event. Credit spreads don’t matter; models don’t matter; intuition doesn’t count. There is no exact mathematical model. The market defines the price.

Recent reactions to the snap poll conducted in Bombay to gauge the atmosphere and expectations about convertibility are symptomatic. Bankers, since their assets are more liquid, and their technology frontline, are optimistic and eager. Industry, alas, is bearish. This doubtless owes in large measure to the manner in which it has been accustomed to function.

The biggest canard meanwhile is that exporters, or those involved in import substitution, alone can extricate us. As matters stand, apart from unjustly enriching a handful, the 'thrust' on exports, based on a rigging of reality and relative prices, has achieved nothing. A telling substantiation of this has been provided in a recent study by Mr. Bimal Roy in the Economic and Political Weekly. He shows how net Indian exports have been stationary over the past 20 years. The study, it may be noted, spans a period over which a variety of fiscal sops were extended to exporters.

Clearly, exports have failed, and there is still a debt to service and repay. Continued tinkering with the convertibility question, therefore, can help only those who would like to varnish the ancient regime. Consider the system now in place. Targeted at exporters and other hopefuls who fetch foreign exchange (FX), it simultaneously imposes a tax on them. This dualism involves that 40 percent of FX earning have to be surrendered to government – but at a rate, which actually undervalues foreign exchange. This is a bit, which then goes towards sustaining official monopsony, and discretionary distribution through channelizing agencies.

The remainder goes towards financing defense purchases, promotion trips, festivals and what not. With a repressed domestic market nestling behind Olympian tariff walls manufacturers who would like to export are, in turn, few. Despite discomfort with Fund–Bank suggestions that Indians, for the present, should concentrate on primary – and lesser value added – exports, that is precisely what manufacturers have been doing while supplying limited quantities of obsolescent manufactures to the domestic tariff area (DTA). Opportunism, and correct opportunity costs make strange bedfellows after all. Without doing away with conditions, which foster the former. India will, in fact, face a future much bleaker than that foretold by even the digitizes.

Note what the present focus on exporters implies. Since, till now, this has been to the exclusion of emphasis on foreign direct investment (FDI)/import substitution through FDI, this implies that, somehow, official – and doubtless entrepreneurial – India prefers to allocate a relatively inferior weight to FX earned/saved through FDI. What, quite evidently disconcerts, more than the presence of aliens, is the cold fear of competition.

Meanwhile, for the intrepid who have already ventured in, the world, which exists, is cozy. Tariff walls and quota restrictions (QRs) allow rentals for all, while the relative overvaluation of exchange rates further spurs the favoured to source more from "home” than from "host'! This is precisely the ambience, which can never kick–start flaccid manufacturers to double as exporters.

The obvious thing to do, therefore, is to introduce competition. And to do so within the DTA, before Fund conditionalities drive the country towards an untimely acceptance of far reaching tariff reductions. This competition will be of no use, however, if all that is yielded is a pantomime confrontation between the obsolescent and the antediluvian, along with the usual rag–tag of 'foreign' add–ons. To avoid this eventuality, nothing less than complete current, and capital account convertibility, along with total industrial liberalization, will do.

Take current account convertibility first. This is the commonest form around, and even economies like Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, quite apart from OECD ones, abide by it.

The closest analogy here is with ISO 9000 certification – currently much in the news. For convertibility too proclaims the existence of certain credible standards which investors, prior to proceeding, like to take for granted. The most crucial one out of these standards has, of course, to do with the ease of profit repatriation.

This is something, which should provide no greater hurt to a nation's integrity that, for instance my banker adversely affects me by charging for his services. Better still, unlike bankers' charges – or interest – this does not entail a recurring charge, regardless of performance. Further, convertibility will happily end official seigniorage where export revenues are concerned. A particularly useful feature of convertibility, meanwhile, is that it prevents the hemorrhaging of retained earnings within the country; such earnings, whenever denied a vent, are usually diverted to speculative uses – or worse.

Secondly, great care must be taken to avoid the temptation to 'fix' the parity. Not only will that preclude needless diversion of energy for the RBI, the efficiency gains of convertibility will also thereby be preserved from sacrifice at the altar of a fetish. Because, if convertibility provides confidence to the prospective investor, floating rates (and import liberalization) serve to keep him on his toes.

The greatest impact of the capital account convertibility would be felt in the banking sector. Total deregulation of the interest rates would instill greater competition in the circle. The weaker banks would further be cornered as `narrow banks`. NPAs reduction would be at focus of attention of banks which would help regaining of its financial health. Margin of banks would be under pressure, infusing adequate asset liability management system in the banks. However, banks will have much more liberal limits for borrowing and deploying funds outside India. Indian banking system should surge ahead in this occasion and accept the challenge by eradicating its weak points and consolidating its financial health.

Directions: Fill I, II, III and IV with P, Q, R and S to make the given passage meaningful.

Agriculture is the backbone of the Indian economy. 70% of the population in India (I)from the agriculture. Basic needs of humans and animals are fulfilled by it. For many agro based industries, it is an (II)the required raw material. India's geographical conditions are favourable for agriculture. India has vast plain areas with fertile soils, (III) and a wide variation in the climatic conditions, etc. India has been making consistent and (IV) using science and technology to increase its production.

P : important source of Q : innovative efforts by R : earns its livelihood S : a long growing season

According to the passage, what is the meaning of the phrase ‘intelligent decisions’?

Directions: Read the given passage carefully and answer the following question.

Ever since machines were invented, scientists have dreamt of making them learn and perform intelligent tasks – like humans. Artificial intelligence is a branch of science which is into making machines think like humans. These machines, or computers, can store large amounts of information and process them accurately and at an amazing speed. What they lack is an ability to learn and make ‘intelligent decisions’.
Scientists are creating new software programs which try to recreate the process of human learning in a computer, in an attempt to make them ‘think’. These programs try to copy the functioning of the brain. One such program is called a neural network. A neural network is a copy of the brain’s functioning inside a computer, using a software program. It can be taught to recognise patterns. In fact, when it is trained, it can classify and identify patterns in a large amount of information. It can do all this at very high speeds and sometimes faster than humans. This throws open innumerable possibilities.

What is the central theme of the passage?

Directions: Read the given passage carefully and answer the following question.

Ever since machines were invented, scientists have dreamt of making them learn and perform intelligent tasks – like humans. Artificial intelligence is a branch of science which is into making machines think like humans. These machines, or computers, can store large amounts of information and process them accurately and at an amazing speed. What they lack is an ability to learn and make ‘intelligent decisions’.
Scientists are creating new software programs which try to recreate the process of human learning in a computer, in an attempt to make them ‘think’. These programs try to copy the functioning of the brain. One such program is called a neural network. A neural network is a copy of the brain’s functioning inside a computer, using a software program. It can be taught to recognise patterns. In fact, when it is trained, it can classify and identify patterns in a large amount of information. It can do all this at very high speeds and sometimes faster than humans. This throws open innumerable possibilities.

How can a neural network help artificial intelligence in computers?

Directions: Read the given passage carefully and answer the following question.

Ever since machines were invented, scientists have dreamt of making them learn and perform intelligent tasks – like humans. Artificial intelligence is a branch of science which is into making machines think like humans. These machines, or computers, can store large amounts of information and process them accurately and at an amazing speed. What they lack is an ability to learn and make ‘intelligent decisions’.
Scientists are creating new software programs which try to recreate the process of human learning in a computer, in an attempt to make them ‘think’. These programs try to copy the functioning of the brain. One such program is called a neural network. A neural network is a copy of the brain’s functioning inside a computer, using a software program. It can be taught to recognise patterns. In fact, when it is trained, it can classify and identify patterns in a large amount of information. It can do all this at very high speeds and sometimes faster than humans. This throws open innumerable possibilities.

According to the passage, how can computer programs copy the functioning of the brain?

Directions: Read the passage carefully and answer the following question.

Ever since machines were invented, scientists have dreamt of making them learn and perform intelligent tasks – like humans. Artificial intelligence is a branch of science which is into making machines think like humans. These machines, or computers, can store large amounts of information and process them accurately and at an amazing speed. What they lack is an ability to learn and make ‘intelligent decisions’.
Scientists are creating new software programs which try to recreate the process of human learning in a computer, in an attempt to make them ‘think’. These programs try to copy the functioning of the brain. One such program is called a neural network. A neural network is a copy of the brain’s functioning inside a computer, using a software program. It can be taught to recognise patterns. In fact, when it is trained, it can classify and identify patterns in a large amount of information. It can do all this at very high speeds and sometimes faster than humans. This throws open innumerable possibilities.

What is the focus of the passage?

Directions: Read the passage and answer the question that follows.

The postage stamp, which began as a piece of paper in token of a receipt of postage, has assumed additional functions. It is a mode of commemorating, celebrating and promoting national heritage and events. It plays a great role as an ambassador, a brand image of the postal administration and a statement of sovereignty of a nation. After independence, the medium of postage stamps in India was initially used to highlight the country's achievements in science and technology as well as its socio-economic development. In keeping with their dual character as a Token of Postage and as a Cultural Ambassador, there are two categories of stamps. The first is meant for day-to-day use as a token of payment of postage on mail articles. The second, on the other hand, are designed and printed with greater aesthetic inputs. They are manufactured in limited quantities and generate great interest among philatelists and collectors.

What does the passage mean by the phrase ‘cultural ambassador’?

Directions: Read the passage and answer the question that follows.

The postage stamp, which began as a piece of paper in token of a receipt of postage, has assumed additional functions. It is a mode of commemorating, celebrating and promoting national heritage and events. It plays a great role as an ambassador, a brand image of the postal administration and a statement of sovereignty of a nation. After independence, the medium of postage stamps in India was initially used to highlight the country's achievements in science and technology as well as its socio-economic development. In keeping with their dual character as a Token of Postage and as a Cultural Ambassador, there are two categories of stamps. The first is meant for day-to-day use as a token of payment of postage on mail articles. The second, on the other hand, are designed and printed with greater aesthetic inputs. They are manufactured in limited quantities and generate great interest among philatelists and collectors.

How important is the ‘dual character’ of postage stamps?

Directions: Read the passage and answer the question that follows.

The postage stamp, which began as a piece of paper in token of a receipt of postage, has assumed additional functions. It is a mode of commemorating, celebrating and promoting national heritage and events. It plays a great role as an ambassador, a brand image of the postal administration and a statement of sovereignty of a nation. After independence, the medium of postage stamps in India was initially used to highlight the country's achievements in science and technology as well as its socio-economic development. In keeping with their dual character as a Token of Postage and as a Cultural Ambassador, there are two categories of stamps. The first is meant for day-to-day use as a token of payment of postage on mail articles. The second, on the other hand, are designed and printed with greater aesthetic inputs. They are manufactured in limited quantities and generate great interest among philatelists and collectors.

According to the passage, what is the importance of the aesthetic inputs of the second type of postage stamps?

Directions: Read the passage and answer the question that follows.

The postage stamp, which began as a piece of paper in token of a receipt of postage, has assumed additional functions. It is a mode of commemorating, celebrating and promoting national heritage and events. It plays a great role as an ambassador, a brand image of the postal administration and a statement of sovereignty of a nation. After independence, the medium of postage stamps in India was initially used to highlight the country's achievements in science and technology as well as its socio-economic development. In keeping with their dual character as a Token of Postage and as a Cultural Ambassador, there are two categories of stamps. The first is meant for day-to-day use as a token of payment of postage on mail articles. The second, on the other hand, are designed and printed with greater aesthetic inputs. They are manufactured in limited quantities and generate great interest among philatelists and collectors.

It can be inferred according to the passage that

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

A Close Reading of the Supreme Court's August 6, 2003 judgment in T. K. Rangarajan vs Government of Tamil Nadu and Others shows that the Court has, following in the footsteps of a string of illiberal verdicts on Government servants beginning in 1962, got hold of the wrong end of the stick. The Attorney General for India, Soli Sorabjee, has done a public service by speaking up against the apex court's observation that there was no moral or equitable right to go on strike. Characterising this as "uncalled for" and "beyond comprehension," he has pointed out that the right of collective bargaining, including the right to strike, was an invaluable entitlement of workers and employees won through years of toil and struggle. Further, there could be "horrendous situations in which the employees have no effective mechanism for redressal of their grievances and are left with no option, but to resort to strike." Implicit in this opinion is a distinction between the merits of particular strikes and the legal and moral status of the right to strike. Here is the voice not merely of law and order and the tenets of `strong' governance — but of democratic entitlement and a sense of history. There were two core issues before the two–member bench. The first was the constitutionality, legality and rightness of the summary dismissal of about 170,000 State Government employees in Tamil Nadu under the State's Essential Services Maintenance Act (ESMA), as amended post facto by an ordinance conferring on the Government the divine right of dismissal, without any application of mind and without giving the employees an opportunity to be heard. The second issue was the status of the right of workers and employees to freedom of association and collective bargaining, including the right to agitate and strike.

In response, the apex court resorted to the technique of providing practical relief in place of a determination of the issues of justice. The relief came through the Court's success in pressuring and persuading the Tamil Nadu Government "gracefully" to agree to reinstate the overwhelming majority of the dismissed employees - not unconditionally, of course, but on submission of an apology and an undertaking not to strike or indulge in "similar activities" in future. The Court rightly found fault with the Madras High Court for not properly construing its power under Article 226 of the Constitution (the power of High Courts to issue certain writs) to "exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to meet [an] unprecedented extraordinary situation having no parallel." Referring to the High Court's totally impractical ruling that over 170,000 employees should first exhaust the "alternative remedy" of going to the one–member State Administrative Tribunal for justice, the Supreme Court found "no justifiable reason for the High Court not to entertain the petitions on the ground of alternative remedy provided under the statute." There is no doubt that getting the Tamil Nadu Government to agree to having three retired High Court Judges decide on the fate of 6072 dismissed or suspended employees within approximately a month is a much better way of providing practical relief than what the High Court offered. The fact that the retired Judges would be nominated by the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court and not by the State Government, that they would decide the representations by the employees without taking into consideration the amended Section 7 of the Act, that the retired Judges' decision would be binding on the State Government, and that aggrieved employees would be free to challenge the decisions before "an appropriate forum" must also be welcomed. However, there is a disturbing implication in the double standards that apply to Ministers and ordinary Government employees facing criminal proceedings. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court has not ruled against the injustice in the Tamil Nadu Government's stand that 6072 employees could not claim "a right to be reinstated" because First Information Reports (FIRs) - which merely set the investigative ball in motion — had purportedly been filed by the State police against them. This contrasts glaringly with a situation where powerful politicians in government, at the Centre and in the States, remain in office unfazed by the fact that charge–sheets have been filed against them in grave criminal cases after the investigations have been completed, and charges have even been framed against them, in some cases, by a court of law.

What is most disturbing about the Supreme Court's judgment in the Tamil Nadu Government employees' case is the a–historical, iniquitous and democratically unsustainable position taken against the right to strike as a part of internationally recognised basic democratic rights. At one level, the judgment seems to revolve round the question whether Government employees have a constitutional or statutory right or moral and equitable justification to go on strike. However, the Court's observations in a case relating exclusively to Government employees go well beyond the immediate issues into status quoits absolutism in the social and philosophical domain. Such absolutism flies in the face of modern India's historical experience of worker agitations and strikes, and the assertion of the right to strike — an experience that begins in the late nineteenth century. Not just Communist organisers, but a range of freedom movement leaders supported the right to agitate and strike as an inalienable democratic right of workers and employees. This newspaper, which will soon be celebrating the 125th anniversary of its founding, may be allowed to recall that during the militant 1921 strike by 10,000 workers of the Buckingham & Carnatic Mills in Chennai, its proprietor and Editor, Kasturi Ranga Iyengar, boldly championed their cause - in The Hindu's columns and through direct involvement in the relief and solidarity efforts. The Supreme Court's latest stance contrasts sadly with both the substance and spirit of earlier progressive rights–led rulings by the apex court, delivered by outstanding jurists of the stature of V. R. Krishna Iyer, Y. V. Chandrachud, A. C. Gupta, D. A. Desai, Jagannatha Shetty and A. M. Ahmadi. Contrary to the impression given by the two–member bench's citation of judgments relating to Government employees, the Supreme Court from the early 1960s has generally upheld the justifiability of, and the moral reasons behind, strikes as legitimate actions by the working class. It is this stream of judicial pronouncements that Mr. Sorabjee was drawing on in criticising the Court's new–fangled observation that there was "no moral or equitable right to go on strike." In the recent case, the Court has cited, not always in context, various judgments to the effect that "employees have no fundamental right to strike," that there is no constitutionally guaranteed right to "effective collective bargaining," that strikes cannot be justified "in the present–day situation" either for a "just or unjust cause," and that the strike weapon "does more harm than any justice." If these quotations were to match the ground reality, then India in 2003 could not claim to be a democracy with any kind of regard for its working people. It would be an authoritarian state out of step with the International Labour Organisation's Conventions on "Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise" and "The Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively", neither of which India has ratified. Undoing the damage done by the Supreme Court's observations in the Tamil Nadu case is the challenge before democratic, political India and it is heartening that the Attorney General has shown the way.

Which among the following rulings of the Madras H. C. has been labelled 'Impractical' by the Apex court?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

A Close Reading of the Supreme Court's August 6, 2003 judgment in T. K. Rangarajan vs Government of Tamil Nadu and Others shows that the Court has, following in the footsteps of a string of illiberal verdicts on Government servants beginning in 1962, got hold of the wrong end of the stick. The Attorney General for India, Soli Sorabjee, has done a public service by speaking up against the apex court's observation that there was no moral or equitable right to go on strike. Characterising this as "uncalled for" and "beyond comprehension," he has pointed out that the right of collective bargaining, including the right to strike, was an invaluable entitlement of workers and employees won through years of toil and struggle. Further, there could be "horrendous situations in which the employees have no effective mechanism for redressal of their grievances and are left with no option, but to resort to strike." Implicit in this opinion is a distinction between the merits of particular strikes and the legal and moral status of the right to strike. Here is the voice not merely of law and order and the tenets of `strong' governance — but of democratic entitlement and a sense of history. There were two core issues before the two–member bench. The first was the constitutionality, legality and rightness of the summary dismissal of about 170,000 State Government employees in Tamil Nadu under the State's Essential Services Maintenance Act (ESMA), as amended post facto by an ordinance conferring on the Government the divine right of dismissal, without any application of mind and without giving the employees an opportunity to be heard. The second issue was the status of the right of workers and employees to freedom of association and collective bargaining, including the right to agitate and strike.

In response, the apex court resorted to the technique of providing practical relief in place of a determination of the issues of justice. The relief came through the Court's success in pressuring and persuading the Tamil Nadu Government "gracefully" to agree to reinstate the overwhelming majority of the dismissed employees - not unconditionally, of course, but on submission of an apology and an undertaking not to strike or indulge in "similar activities" in future. The Court rightly found fault with the Madras High Court for not properly construing its power under Article 226 of the Constitution (the power of High Courts to issue certain writs) to "exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to meet [an] unprecedented extraordinary situation having no parallel." Referring to the High Court's totally impractical ruling that over 170,000 employees should first exhaust the "alternative remedy" of going to the one–member State Administrative Tribunal for justice, the Supreme Court found "no justifiable reason for the High Court not to entertain the petitions on the ground of alternative remedy provided under the statute." There is no doubt that getting the Tamil Nadu Government to agree to having three retired High Court Judges decide on the fate of 6072 dismissed or suspended employees within approximately a month is a much better way of providing practical relief than what the High Court offered. The fact that the retired Judges would be nominated by the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court and not by the State Government, that they would decide the representations by the employees without taking into consideration the amended Section 7 of the Act, that the retired Judges' decision would be binding on the State Government, and that aggrieved employees would be free to challenge the decisions before "an appropriate forum" must also be welcomed. However, there is a disturbing implication in the double standards that apply to Ministers and ordinary Government employees facing criminal proceedings. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court has not ruled against the injustice in the Tamil Nadu Government's stand that 6072 employees could not claim "a right to be reinstated" because First Information Reports (FIRs) - which merely set the investigative ball in motion — had purportedly been filed by the State police against them. This contrasts glaringly with a situation where powerful politicians in government, at the Centre and in the States, remain in office unfazed by the fact that charge–sheets have been filed against them in grave criminal cases after the investigations have been completed, and charges have even been framed against them, in some cases, by a court of law.

What is most disturbing about the Supreme Court's judgment in the Tamil Nadu Government employees' case is the a–historical, iniquitous and democratically unsustainable position taken against the right to strike as a part of internationally recognised basic democratic rights. At one level, the judgment seems to revolve round the question whether Government employees have a constitutional or statutory right or moral and equitable justification to go on strike. However, the Court's observations in a case relating exclusively to Government employees go well beyond the immediate issues into status quoits absolutism in the social and philosophical domain. Such absolutism flies in the face of modern India's historical experience of worker agitations and strikes, and the assertion of the right to strike — an experience that begins in the late nineteenth century. Not just Communist organisers, but a range of freedom movement leaders supported the right to agitate and strike as an inalienable democratic right of workers and employees. This newspaper, which will soon be celebrating the 125th anniversary of its founding, may be allowed to recall that during the militant 1921 strike by 10,000 workers of the Buckingham & Carnatic Mills in Chennai, its proprietor and Editor, Kasturi Ranga Iyengar, boldly championed their cause - in The Hindu's columns and through direct involvement in the relief and solidarity efforts. The Supreme Court's latest stance contrasts sadly with both the substance and spirit of earlier progressive rights–led rulings by the apex court, delivered by outstanding jurists of the stature of V. R. Krishna Iyer, Y. V. Chandrachud, A. C. Gupta, D. A. Desai, Jagannatha Shetty and A. M. Ahmadi. Contrary to the impression given by the two–member bench's citation of judgments relating to Government employees, the Supreme Court from the early 1960s has generally upheld the justifiability of, and the moral reasons behind, strikes as legitimate actions by the working class. It is this stream of judicial pronouncements that Mr. Sorabjee was drawing on in criticising the Court's new–fangled observation that there was "no moral or equitable right to go on strike." In the recent case, the Court has cited, not always in context, various judgments to the effect that "employees have no fundamental right to strike," that there is no constitutionally guaranteed right to "effective collective bargaining," that strikes cannot be justified "in the present–day situation" either for a "just or unjust cause," and that the strike weapon "does more harm than any justice." If these quotations were to match the ground reality, then India in 2003 could not claim to be a democracy with any kind of regard for its working people. It would be an authoritarian state out of step with the International Labour Organisation's Conventions on "Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise" and "The Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively", neither of which India has ratified. Undoing the damage done by the Supreme Court's observations in the Tamil Nadu case is the challenge before democratic, political India and it is heartening that the Attorney General has shown the way.