Postwar US Foreign Policy

The central idea of the passage is

(1) Most twentieth-century Americans found bio-terrorism—the deliberate release of disease-causing microorganisms with the aim of causing devastating epidemics—unthinkable, perhaps even more so than nuclear war. Along with chemical warfare, biological warfare was forbidden by the 1925 Geneva Convention. More “civilized” nations regarded countries known to have tested biological weapons, such as Japan during World War II,

(10) with horror. To be sure, during the 1950s and 1960s, both the United States and the Soviet Union developed bio-weapons programs— purely, they said, for defense in case the other side used such terrible weapons first. In 1969, however, President Richard Nixon formally ended the U.S. bio-weapons program, and in 1972, the United Nations established the international Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in which all

(20) signatory nations pledged never to develop, produce, or stockpile such weapons. Both the United States and Russia signed it. 
Confidence that no one would ever dare to use bioweapons began to be shaken during the late 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet government in 1991, Ken Alibek (Kanatjan Alibekov), former deputy director of the Soviet bioweapons program, revealed that the program had continued long after 1972.

(30) Rumors circulated that some of the Soviet Union’s bioweapons stock had fallen into the hands of smaller nations, such as Iraq and North Korea. The Clinton administration carried out simulation exercises for smallpox and plague attacks on civilian populations in 1999 and 2000, and Congress budgeted more than $1.5 billion specifically for bioterrorism preparedness in fiscal year 2000, more than double the amount allotted in the

(40) previous year.
The idea that disgruntled individuals or small groups as well as rogue governments might employ bioterror weapons also began to circulate around the start of the new century. Some writers called bioweapons “the poor man’s atomic bomb” because they were easier and cheaper to produce than nuclear weapons. Experts pointed out that these smaller groups might not be deterred by

(50) factors that might limit the activities of national governments, such as fear of massive retaliation. 
The most popular proposed bioterror microbe was the bacterium that causes anthrax, a disease usually confined to hoofed animals such as cattle and sheep but able to infect humans, often with fatal results. Anthrax bacteria were appealing because under harsh conditions they encase themselves in

(60) protective cocoons, forming spores that are almost impossible to destroy by methods that normally kill bacteria. Dried and ground into powder, such spores would be fairly easy for terrorists to distribute, and they would revert to their disease-causing form once they entered a human or animal body. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, letters or parcels supposedly containing anthrax spores appeared so often that an article in the July

(70) 1999 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists called sending them a “hot new hobby.” There were more than 150 anthrax incidents between March 1998 and July 1999 alone. 
Every one of them, however, was a hoax. No one, it seemed, had actually been both willing and able to mail the deadly bacteria—and many experts doubted that anyone ever would. Some stressed that preparing and effectively distributing microorganisms as

(80) bioweapons required more technical skill and equipment than small groups were likely to possess. Others pointed out that there had been only one documented bioterror attack on American soil: In 1984, followers of cult guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh added salmonella bacteria to restaurant salad bars to sicken citizens in The Dalles, Oregon, so they would not vote in an election that the group wanted to influence. The attack made 751 people

(90) mildly ill but caused no deaths. 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, therefore, articles containing dire warnings about bioterrorism were matched by an almost equal number expressing powerful skepticism. For instance, W. Seth Carus, senior research professor and bioterrorism specialist at National Defense University, stated in a 1999 New Republic article that “the threat [of bioterrorism] is less compelling
(100) and not as imminent as often claimed.” Similarly, Barbara Rosenberg, chair of the Federation of American Scientists Working Group on Biological Weapons, was quoted in June 2001 as claiming that “even those in high places in the military judge bioterror to be a low probability here in the U.S.” Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in July 1999, attributed fear of bioterrorism to

(110) government exaggeration reinforced by “an obsessive fascination with catastrophic terrorism” in Hollywood films and popular novels. 
Perhaps even more tellingly, most of the media, along with the bulk of the American public, ignored the bioterrorism issue entirely during this period. InfoTrac, a wide-reaching periodical database, cites only seventy articles on the subject between the

(120) database’s earliest records in 1980 and the end of August 2001. John R. Hamre, head of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., himself was concerned about bioterrorism but admitted in April 2001 that it was “not something that average Americans worry much about.” 
Then came the terrorist airplane attacks on New York’s World Trade Center on September 11, 2001—and three weeks later,

(130)Bob Stevens, photo editor for a supermarket tabloid in Boca Raton, Florida, entered JFK Medical Center in the nearby city of Atlantis suffering from chills and fever. Emergency room doctors thought he might have meningitis, a brain infection, but Larry Bush, the hospital’s chief of staff and an experienced specialist in infectious diseases, looked at a sample of Stevens’s spinal fluid under a microscope and made a far more

(140) startling diagnosis: anthrax. A Florida laboratory confirmed the diagnosis on October 4, and Stevens died a day later. Careful checks of his background and activities showed that there was no way he could have caught the disease naturally. Hours after Stevens’s death, a man who had worked in the same building— the supervisor of the mail room—was admitted to a Miami hospital with what proved to be another case

(150) of anthrax. The unthinkable had become not only thinkable but real. 
As the anthrax attacks continued and expanded over the next two months, bioterrorism became the year’s third-hottest story, dwarfed only by the World Trade Center disaster and the war in Afghanistan. InfoTrac lists 545 articles about bioterrorism published during October and November alone. After the attacks had spread to major

(160) media offices in New York and closed down the office buildings of the U.S. Senate in Washington and had been shown to be spread by something that entered everyone’s home—the mail—even respected NBC news anchorman Tom Brokaw signed off one night by saying, “In Cipro [the antibiotic being used to prevent and treat anthrax] we trust.” Then and later, many opinions were expressed about what was being done or should be

(170) done to combat actual and potential bioterror attacks—but skepticism about the likelihood of such attacks was no longer among them. 
The fall 2001 anthrax outbreak was a far cry from the apocalyptic scenarios envisioned in movies and government simulations. A mere twenty-one people caught the disease, and only five died. Nonetheless, this handful of individuals changed Americans’ worldview forever because they were far from the only

(180) casualties of the still untraced attacks. Also severely stricken were an already-shaky economy, the U.S. postal system, and, perhaps most telling of all, the public’s confidence that “it can’t happen here.” Ruth Levy Guyer and Jonathan D. Moreno wrote in Social Education in March 2002, “The anthrax events have done great physical damage to a small number of individuals. . . . The events have done great psychological damage to

(190) many more. Bioweapons were once the stuff of science fiction . . . today they are the realities of contemporary life.”

The role played by the recent politicians in the given topic can be:

(1) IF THERE WAS any doubt remaining about why the United States needs a missile defense system, it was dispelled recently by the actions of North Korea. Having shunned negotiations, North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship leaves little doubt about its access to nuclear weaponry. Seven years ago the North Koreans demonstrated long-range missile capability and are now suspected of having the means to strike

(10) Hawaii, Alaska, and the western United States. It recently ended its moratorium on long-range missile testing. Yet in the face of this crisis, the Defense Department's proposed budget slashes $1 billion this year and billions more over the next five years from the only program that can protect Americans from such grave and hostile threats.And North Korea is not the only threat.

(20) Ballistic missile technology is widely available and will only spread over time. Many nations can launch short- and medium-range missiles, and numerous others have access to advanced long-range missile technology.
Unfortunately, the wavering commitment of past presidents and Congresses has left the United States virtually defenseless against ballistic missile attacks today. Until now, our

(30) nation was protected by a single ineffectual layer -- rhetoric. President Bush's December 2001 decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and proceed with the deployment of an ambitious multilayered missile defense overcame this seemingly insurmountable hurdle. Much progress has been made, and a limited defense against North Korea is under construction in Alaska and California.

(40) The challenge is whether the United States will live up to the rhetoric and continue providing the resources and resolve needed to defend the nation against a catastrophic threat in the face of pressing financial burdens.
A robust defense deters rogue nations and terrorist groups. By lowering the probability of a successful missile strike, the enemy is denied the certainty of its effectiveness and

(50) is virtually guaranteed retaliation for such an attack. Additionally, one should be mindful not only of the cost of the system but the protection it is designed to provide -- the only real protection against a limited nuclear-, biological-, or chemical-armed ballistic missile attack.
Building a robust, multilayered defense is not an easy task. The technologies are sophisticated, the engineering is

(60) challenging, and the global integration of sensors, assets, and communications to precisely hit a ''bullet with a bullet" is daunting. Important steps have been taken, but much more is needed.
The eight interceptors recently deployed in Alaska and California provides a limited defense against the North Korean threat. If it were expanded, it would offer protection against missiles launched from the Middle

 (70) East. Not surprisingly, moving the system from the drawing board to the field is challenging. Deploying advanced systems is not without complication, but the fundamental ability to intercept and destroy an attacking missile has been demonstrated.
Continued work is necessary, but the proliferation of ballistic missile technology calls for an even more comprehensive

(80) approach. Facing a period of fiscal austerity and a billion-dollar budget cut, the missile defense program must reexamine its options and place a premium on those approaches capable of producing highly adaptable defenses that can engage threats from multiple locations around the globe and defend against short-, medium-, and long-range missiles.
We cannot firmly predict the threats we will

(90) face tomorrow. A missile defense is a hedge against that state of uncertainty. North Korea's recent actions serve as a reminder that the threat of a missile attack is not some flight of fancy but a serious hazard to the United States, which should prompt it to redouble efforts to protect the American people.

Which of the following cannot be the possible reason for the slashing of defense budget?

(1) IF THERE WAS any doubt remaining about why the United States needs a missile defense system, it was dispelled recently by the actions of North Korea. Having shunned negotiations, North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship leaves little doubt about its access to nuclear weaponry. Seven years ago the North Koreans demonstrated long-range missile capability and are now suspected of having the means to strike

(10) Hawaii, Alaska, and the western United States. It recently ended its moratorium on long-range missile testing. Yet in the face of this crisis, the Defense Department's proposed budget slashes $1 billion this year and billions more over the next five years from the only program that can protect Americans from such grave and hostile threats.And North Korea is not the only threat.

(20) Ballistic missile technology is widely available and will only spread over time. Many nations can launch short- and medium-range missiles, and numerous others have access to advanced long-range missile technology.
Unfortunately, the wavering commitment of past presidents and Congresses has left the United States virtually defenseless against ballistic missile attacks today. Until now, our

(30) nation was protected by a single ineffectual layer -- rhetoric. President Bush's December 2001 decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and proceed with the deployment of an ambitious multilayered missile defense overcame this seemingly insurmountable hurdle. Much progress has been made, and a limited defense against North Korea is under construction in Alaska and California.

(40) The challenge is whether the United States will live up to the rhetoric and continue providing the resources and resolve needed to defend the nation against a catastrophic threat in the face of pressing financial burdens.
A robust defense deters rogue nations and terrorist groups. By lowering the probability of a successful missile strike, the enemy is denied the certainty of its effectiveness and

(50) is virtually guaranteed retaliation for such an attack. Additionally, one should be mindful not only of the cost of the system but the protection it is designed to provide -- the only real protection against a limited nuclear-, biological-, or chemical-armed ballistic missile attack.
Building a robust, multilayered defense is not an easy task. The technologies are sophisticated, the engineering is

(60) challenging, and the global integration of sensors, assets, and communications to precisely hit a ''bullet with a bullet" is daunting. Important steps have been taken, but much more is needed.
The eight interceptors recently deployed in Alaska and California provides a limited defense against the North Korean threat. If it were expanded, it would offer protection against missiles launched from the Middle

 (70) East. Not surprisingly, moving the system from the drawing board to the field is challenging. Deploying advanced systems is not without complication, but the fundamental ability to intercept and destroy an attacking missile has been demonstrated.
Continued work is necessary, but the proliferation of ballistic missile technology calls for an even more comprehensive

(80) approach. Facing a period of fiscal austerity and a billion-dollar budget cut, the missile defense program must reexamine its options and place a premium on those approaches capable of producing highly adaptable defenses that can engage threats from multiple locations around the globe and defend against short-, medium-, and long-range missiles.
We cannot firmly predict the threats we will

(90) face tomorrow. A missile defense is a hedge against that state of uncertainty. North Korea's recent actions serve as a reminder that the threat of a missile attack is not some flight of fancy but a serious hazard to the United States, which should prompt it to redouble efforts to protect the American people.

Which one of the following options is not the feature of a bioweapon?

(1) Most twentieth-century Americans found bio-terrorism—the deliberate release of disease-causing microorganisms with the aim of causing devastating epidemics—unthinkable, perhaps even more so than nuclear war. Along with chemical warfare, biological warfare was forbidden by the 1925 Geneva Convention. More “civilized” nations regarded countries known to have tested biological weapons, such as Japan during World War II,

(10) with horror. To be sure, during the 1950s and 1960s, both the United States and the Soviet Union developed bio-weapons programs— purely, they said, for defense in case the other side used such terrible weapons first. In 1969, however, President Richard Nixon formally ended the U.S. bio-weapons program, and in 1972, the United Nations established the international Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in which all

(20) signatory nations pledged never to develop, produce, or stockpile such weapons. Both the United States and Russia signed it. 
Confidence that no one would ever dare to use bioweapons began to be shaken during the late 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet government in 1991, Ken Alibek (Kanatjan Alibekov), former deputy director of the Soviet bioweapons program, revealed that the program had continued long after 1972.

(30) Rumors circulated that some of the Soviet Union’s bioweapons stock had fallen into the hands of smaller nations, such as Iraq and North Korea. The Clinton administration carried out simulation exercises for smallpox and plague attacks on civilian populations in 1999 and 2000, and Congress budgeted more than $1.5 billion specifically for bioterrorism preparedness in fiscal year 2000, more than double the amount allotted in the

(40) previous year.
The idea that disgruntled individuals or small groups as well as rogue governments might employ bioterror weapons also began to circulate around the start of the new century. Some writers called bioweapons “the poor man’s atomic bomb” because they were easier and cheaper to produce than nuclear weapons. Experts pointed out that these smaller groups might not be deterred by

(50) factors that might limit the activities of national governments, such as fear of massive retaliation. 
The most popular proposed bioterror microbe was the bacterium that causes anthrax, a disease usually confined to hoofed animals such as cattle and sheep but able to infect humans, often with fatal results. Anthrax bacteria were appealing because under harsh conditions they encase themselves in

(60) protective cocoons, forming spores that are almost impossible to destroy by methods that normally kill bacteria. Dried and ground into powder, such spores would be fairly easy for terrorists to distribute, and they would revert to their disease-causing form once they entered a human or animal body. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, letters or parcels supposedly containing anthrax spores appeared so often that an article in the July

(70) 1999 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists called sending them a “hot new hobby.” There were more than 150 anthrax incidents between March 1998 and July 1999 alone. 
Every one of them, however, was a hoax. No one, it seemed, had actually been both willing and able to mail the deadly bacteria—and many experts doubted that anyone ever would. Some stressed that preparing and effectively distributing microorganisms as

(80) bioweapons required more technical skill and equipment than small groups were likely to possess. Others pointed out that there had been only one documented bioterror attack on American soil: In 1984, followers of cult guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh added salmonella bacteria to restaurant salad bars to sicken citizens in The Dalles, Oregon, so they would not vote in an election that the group wanted to influence. The attack made 751 people

(90) mildly ill but caused no deaths. 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, therefore, articles containing dire warnings about bioterrorism were matched by an almost equal number expressing powerful skepticism. For instance, W. Seth Carus, senior research professor and bioterrorism specialist at National Defense University, stated in a 1999 New Republic article that “the threat [of bioterrorism] is less compelling
(100) and not as imminent as often claimed.” Similarly, Barbara Rosenberg, chair of the Federation of American Scientists Working Group on Biological Weapons, was quoted in June 2001 as claiming that “even those in high places in the military judge bioterror to be a low probability here in the U.S.” Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in July 1999, attributed fear of bioterrorism to

(110) government exaggeration reinforced by “an obsessive fascination with catastrophic terrorism” in Hollywood films and popular novels. 
Perhaps even more tellingly, most of the media, along with the bulk of the American public, ignored the bioterrorism issue entirely during this period. InfoTrac, a wide-reaching periodical database, cites only seventy articles on the subject between the

(120) database’s earliest records in 1980 and the end of August 2001. John R. Hamre, head of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., himself was concerned about bioterrorism but admitted in April 2001 that it was “not something that average Americans worry much about.” 
Then came the terrorist airplane attacks on New York’s World Trade Center on September 11, 2001—and three weeks later,

(130)Bob Stevens, photo editor for a supermarket tabloid in Boca Raton, Florida, entered JFK Medical Center in the nearby city of Atlantis suffering from chills and fever. Emergency room doctors thought he might have meningitis, a brain infection, but Larry Bush, the hospital’s chief of staff and an experienced specialist in infectious diseases, looked at a sample of Stevens’s spinal fluid under a microscope and made a far more

(140) startling diagnosis: anthrax. A Florida laboratory confirmed the diagnosis on October 4, and Stevens died a day later. Careful checks of his background and activities showed that there was no way he could have caught the disease naturally. Hours after Stevens’s death, a man who had worked in the same building— the supervisor of the mail room—was admitted to a Miami hospital with what proved to be another case

(150) of anthrax. The unthinkable had become not only thinkable but real. 
As the anthrax attacks continued and expanded over the next two months, bioterrorism became the year’s third-hottest story, dwarfed only by the World Trade Center disaster and the war in Afghanistan. InfoTrac lists 545 articles about bioterrorism published during October and November alone. After the attacks had spread to major

(160) media offices in New York and closed down the office buildings of the U.S. Senate in Washington and had been shown to be spread by something that entered everyone’s home—the mail—even respected NBC news anchorman Tom Brokaw signed off one night by saying, “In Cipro [the antibiotic being used to prevent and treat anthrax] we trust.” Then and later, many opinions were expressed about what was being done or should be

(170) done to combat actual and potential bioterror attacks—but skepticism about the likelihood of such attacks was no longer among them. 
The fall 2001 anthrax outbreak was a far cry from the apocalyptic scenarios envisioned in movies and government simulations. A mere twenty-one people caught the disease, and only five died. Nonetheless, this handful of individuals changed Americans’ worldview forever because they were far from the only

(180) casualties of the still untraced attacks. Also severely stricken were an already-shaky economy, the U.S. postal system, and, perhaps most telling of all, the public’s confidence that “it can’t happen here.” Ruth Levy Guyer and Jonathan D. Moreno wrote in Social Education in March 2002, “The anthrax events have done great physical damage to a small number of individuals. . . . The events have done great psychological damage to

(190) many more. Bioweapons were once the stuff of science fiction . . . today they are the realities of contemporary life.”

What does the author mean by fiscal in line 80?

(1) IF THERE WAS any doubt remaining about why the United States needs a missile defense system, it was dispelled recently by the actions of North Korea. Having shunned negotiations, North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship leaves little doubt about its access to nuclear weaponry. Seven years ago the North Koreans demonstrated long-range missile capability and are now suspected of having the means to strike

(10) Hawaii, Alaska, and the western United States. It recently ended its moratorium on long-range missile testing. Yet in the face of this crisis, the Defense Department's proposed budget slashes $1 billion this year and billions more over the next five years from the only program that can protect Americans from such grave and hostile threats.And North Korea is not the only threat.

(20) Ballistic missile technology is widely available and will only spread over time. Many nations can launch short- and medium-range missiles, and numerous others have access to advanced long-range missile technology.
Unfortunately, the wavering commitment of past presidents and Congresses has left the United States virtually defenseless against ballistic missile attacks today. Until now, our

(30) nation was protected by a single ineffectual layer -- rhetoric. President Bush's December 2001 decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and proceed with the deployment of an ambitious multilayered missile defense overcame this seemingly insurmountable hurdle. Much progress has been made, and a limited defense against North Korea is under construction in Alaska and California.

(40) The challenge is whether the United States will live up to the rhetoric and continue providing the resources and resolve needed to defend the nation against a catastrophic threat in the face of pressing financial burdens.
A robust defense deters rogue nations and terrorist groups. By lowering the probability of a successful missile strike, the enemy is denied the certainty of its effectiveness and

(50) is virtually guaranteed retaliation for such an attack. Additionally, one should be mindful not only of the cost of the system but the protection it is designed to provide -- the only real protection against a limited nuclear-, biological-, or chemical-armed ballistic missile attack.
Building a robust, multilayered defense is not an easy task. The technologies are sophisticated, the engineering is

(60) challenging, and the global integration of sensors, assets, and communications to precisely hit a ''bullet with a bullet" is daunting. Important steps have been taken, but much more is needed.
The eight interceptors recently deployed in Alaska and California provides a limited defense against the North Korean threat. If it were expanded, it would offer protection against missiles launched from the Middle

 (70) East. Not surprisingly, moving the system from the drawing board to the field is challenging. Deploying advanced systems is not without complication, but the fundamental ability to intercept and destroy an attacking missile has been demonstrated.
Continued work is necessary, but the proliferation of ballistic missile technology calls for an even more comprehensive

(80) approach. Facing a period of fiscal austerity and a billion-dollar budget cut, the missile defense program must reexamine its options and place a premium on those approaches capable of producing highly adaptable defenses that can engage threats from multiple locations around the globe and defend against short-, medium-, and long-range missiles.
We cannot firmly predict the threats we will

(90) face tomorrow. A missile defense is a hedge against that state of uncertainty. North Korea's recent actions serve as a reminder that the threat of a missile attack is not some flight of fancy but a serious hazard to the United States, which should prompt it to redouble efforts to protect the American people.