Epistemology and Skepticism

What is zero ended rationalism?

Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.

A zero-ended rationalism about computers is that "they only do what they are programmed to". The reasoning goes something like this: If one incorporates into a computer the capability to recognise the meaning and function of the symbols representing 'two', 'multiply' and 'equals to' then it would have no problem solving the equation : 2 x 2 =?

But how different is this really from what a child learns in grade school? It's exactly the same. There can definitely be no propensity in certain children to be better in maths than others since arithmetic even at a lowly human level is, after all, only an acquired trait and acquired traits are not inherited.
Similarly, if a computer could be made to intimately internalize the moves, strengths and positional advantages of pieces like the Queen or the Bishop, it should have no problem creaming Kasparov as it would also have the added advantage of number crunching to check out moves so many zillions of nano-seconds in advance.

However, what has been missing so far in the environment of a computer and why it required so many avatars of IBM's Deep Blue programme to outwit our number one grand-master, is the role of a family and the nurture it provides for a potential predisposition. This is because genetically, some children could have stronger musculature to become better cricketers or actors but only when given the necessary ambient training. The answer therefore lies not in suddenly blitzing a super computer's hardware memory and logic bank its equivalent of musculature with the rules, and strategy's of some table game but to bring it home as a baby.

Over the years, fostered by gentle but continuous inputs it would be able to assimilate the secret innuendoes of a game, for instance like bridge, and learn to play it with class instead of simply knowing all possible probabilities of a given hand to the n-th card-played.

An example of a zero ended rationalism could be _____________________.

Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.

A zero-ended rationalism about computers is that "they only do what they are programmed to". The reasoning goes something like this: If one incorporates into a computer the capability to recognise the meaning and function of the symbols representing 'two', 'multiply' and 'equals to' then it would have no problem solving the equation : 2 x 2 =?

But how different is this really from what a child learns in grade school? It's exactly the same. There can definitely be no propensity in certain children to be better in maths than others since arithmetic even at a lowly human level is, after all, only an acquired trait and acquired traits are not inherited.
Similarly, if a computer could be made to intimately internalize the moves, strengths and positional advantages of pieces like the Queen or the Bishop, it should have no problem creaming Kasparov as it would also have the added advantage of number crunching to check out moves so many zillions of nano-seconds in advance.

However, what has been missing so far in the environment of a computer and why it required so many avatars of IBM's Deep Blue programme to outwit our number one grand-master, is the role of a family and the nurture it provides for a potential predisposition. This is because genetically, some children could have stronger musculature to become better cricketers or actors but only when given the necessary ambient training. The answer therefore lies not in suddenly blitzing a super computer's hardware memory and logic bank its equivalent of musculature with the rules, and strategy's of some table game but to bring it home as a baby.

Over the years, fostered by gentle but continuous inputs it would be able to assimilate the secret innuendoes of a game, for instance like bridge, and learn to play it with class instead of simply knowing all possible probabilities of a given hand to the n-th card-played.

Which of the following are the main arguments of trans-empiricists against empirical study?1. Human behaviour cannot be studied with objectivity.

1. Political phenomenon is not amenable to experimental enquiry.
2. A purely descriptive approach has no advantage.
3. Political science cannot refuse to show concern with questions of right and wrong. Select the correct answer using the code given below:

Consider the following statements:

1. Positivism emphasized precision, constructive power and relativism.
2. Positivists understood meaningful analysis as possible only through tautologies and empirical statements.
3. The empiricism believed that observation and experience as source of knowledge had no significance for positivism. Which of the statements given above are correct?

When we realize the obstacles in the way of a straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched in the study of philosophy — for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not carelessly or dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.

The author's attitude towards philosophy identifies philosophy as

Directions: Answer the question based on the following passage.

Many of the philosophers we have been reading in class seem to me to be hopelessly dated (although some of them express useful ideas and/or make good points). Of course, it's easy to become trapped in writing only for the period a person lives in, and a philosophy is necessarily dependant on the historical situation and the extent of man's knowledge. And many of the philosophers who have existed over the course of the centuries have necessarily had to worry about governmental, church, or societal disapproval, censorship, or punishment. (Socrates, for instance, was sentenced to death by a court for the crime of explaining his ideas.)

However, Victor Hugo said that if he were writing for his own time only, he would have to break his pen and throw it away. As so it seems that, in order for a philosopher to be relevant for the future as well as the present, he must take into account all of the objections to his philosophy which can be anticipated at the present time. And it seems to me that the most frequent objections to modern and pre-modern (but not postmodern) philosophers come from the incompatibility of their philosophies with what is considered to be established scientific fact. For instance, Plato's theory of forms does not, to me, seem to jibe with modern physics and cosmology. And although I can only vaguely glimpse the psychology which underlies Kant, it seems to be highly questionable. (In my view, application of Kant's epistemology and metaphysics could never produce an artificial intelligence capable of passing a Turing test.) And so, it seems to me, the best way that a philosopher can keep from being dated is to be aware of scientific knowledge, and integrate it into philosophy. Of course, this necessitates an independent evaluation of the merits and drawbacks of a given scientific idea, which necessitates, in turn, a thorough knowledge of that theory.

After all, physics can give us insights into metaphysics, since both seek different ways to do the same thing; psychology, sociology, anthropology, and archeology can give us insights into epistemology; various "soft" sciences dealing with comparative cultures can provide food for thought in ethics, and so on. History is, of course, necessary to any understanding of a philosophy: how it came about, what people did with it, etc. Sartre, although he developed some of his ideas from Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, probably could not have expounded those same ideas of existentialism in their times; Nietzsche, who popularized the idea that "God is dead"; could not have written in the time of Descartes; and Descartes could not have expressed (or, possibly, even produced) his.

I suppose that my point is that philosophy does not (and should not, and must not) stand apart from the rest of the sciences (and it should, can, and must be a science). Rather, Philosophy should be integrated with the rest of the sciences through a method of rational judgment. Rather than sailing behind, or next to but away from, the rest of the sciences, Philosophy should be the flagship of the group. Although the other sciences can provide us with data, observations, and theories, only philosophy can integrate those into a coherent whole, tell us what to do with them, or provide a meaningful context for using these facts in our daily lives.

From where does philosophy draw its relevance to the modern world?

Directions: Answer the question based on the following passage.

Many of the philosophers we have been reading in class seem to me to be hopelessly dated (although some of them express useful ideas and/or make good points). Of course, it's easy to become trapped in writing only for the period a person lives in, and a philosophy is necessarily dependant on the historical situation and the extent of man's knowledge. And many of the philosophers who have existed over the course of the centuries have necessarily had to worry about governmental, church, or societal disapproval, censorship, or punishment. (Socrates, for instance, was sentenced to death by a court for the crime of explaining his ideas.)

However, Victor Hugo said that if he were writing for his own time only, he would have to break his pen and throw it away. As so it seems that, in order for a philosopher to be relevant for the future as well as the present, he must take into account all of the objections to his philosophy which can be anticipated at the present time. And it seems to me that the most frequent objections to modern and pre-modern (but not postmodern) philosophers come from the incompatibility of their philosophies with what is considered to be established scientific fact. For instance, Plato's theory of forms does not, to me, seem to jibe with modern physics and cosmology. And although I can only vaguely glimpse the psychology which underlies Kant, it seems to be highly questionable. (In my view, application of Kant's epistemology and metaphysics could never produce an artificial intelligence capable of passing a Turing test.) And so, it seems to me, the best way that a philosopher can keep from being dated is to be aware of scientific knowledge, and integrate it into philosophy. Of course, this necessitates an independent evaluation of the merits and drawbacks of a given scientific idea, which necessitates, in turn, a thorough knowledge of that theory.

After all, physics can give us insights into metaphysics, since both seek different ways to do the same thing; psychology, sociology, anthropology, and archeology can give us insights into epistemology; various "soft" sciences dealing with comparative cultures can provide food for thought in ethics, and so on. History is, of course, necessary to any understanding of a philosophy: how it came about, what people did with it, etc. Sartre, although he developed some of his ideas from Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, probably could not have expounded those same ideas of existentialism in their times; Nietzsche, who popularized the idea that "God is dead"; could not have written in the time of Descartes; and Descartes could not have expressed (or, possibly, even produced) his.

I suppose that my point is that philosophy does not (and should not, and must not) stand apart from the rest of the sciences (and it should, can, and must be a science). Rather, Philosophy should be integrated with the rest of the sciences through a method of rational judgment. Rather than sailing behind, or next to but away from, the rest of the sciences, Philosophy should be the flagship of the group. Although the other sciences can provide us with data, observations, and theories, only philosophy can integrate those into a coherent whole, tell us what to do with them, or provide a meaningful context for using these facts in our daily lives.

Directions: Select the two answer choices that, when used to complete the sentence, fit the meaning of the sentence as a whole and produce completed sentences that are alike in meaning.

Central to all such “cognitive” approaches is a robust notion of rationality in the ________ of scientific theories or research programs.

What does the author think about that aspect of the mind about which we do not have proven facts?

I. It comes under the realm of metaphysics. II. It may one day come under the realm of science. III. It is departed from science.

Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.

Which of the following cannot be derived from the passage?

Directions: The passage below is followed by a question based on its content. Answer the question on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.

What will help our argument 'see light' (line 17), according to the passage?

Knowledge theorists opine that risk management is actually a combination of management of uncertainty, risk, equivocality and error. Uncertainty arises due to lack of information. As information gathering progresses, uncertainty transforms into risk. In uncertainty, outcomes cannot be estimated even randomly. This is possible in the case of risk. As information about markets and knowledge about possible outcomes increases, risk management provides solutions for cutting risk. Equivocality arises due to conflicting interpretations and the resultant lack of judgement. This happens despite adequate knowledge of the situation. Institutions develop control systems to reduce errors, information systems to reduce uncertainty, incentive systems to manage agency problems in a risk-reward framework and cultural systems to deal with equivocality. Which of the following can't be inferred from the paragraph?