Personal Identity and Its Criteria

David Hume is most closely associated with the bundle theory of personal identity, which states that personal identity is constituted by a bundle of mental and physical characteristics.

The main objection to the bundle theory of personal identity is that it relies on a circular definition of personal identity. The theory defines personal identity as a bundle of mental and physical characteristics, but it then uses personal identity to define the mental and physical characteristics that constitute it.

Paul Ricoeur is most closely associated with the narrative theory of personal identity, which states that personal identity is constituted by the narrative that we tell about our lives.

The main objection to the narrative theory of personal identity is that it is too subjective. The theory states that personal identity is constituted by the narrative that we tell about our lives, but this narrative is subject to change and revision. This means that our personal identity could also change and revise, which seems problematic.

Sydney Shoemaker is most closely associated with the psychological theory of personal identity, which states that personal identity is constituted by our psychological continuity.

The main objection to the psychological theory of personal identity is that it is incompatible with the idea of reincarnation. The theory states that personal identity is constituted by our psychological continuity, but if we were to reincarnate, our psychological continuity would be broken. This would mean that we would not be the same person in our next life, which seems problematic.

Derek Parfit is most closely associated with the bodily theory of personal identity, which states that personal identity is constituted by our bodily continuity.

The main objection to the bodily theory of personal identity is that it is incompatible with the idea of teleportation. If we were to teleport, our bodily continuity would be broken. This would mean that we would not be the same person after teleportation, which seems problematic.

Bernard Williams is most closely associated with the survival theory of personal identity, which states that personal identity is constituted by our survival after death.

The main objection to the survival theory of personal identity is that it is incompatible with the idea of reincarnation. The theory states that personal identity is constituted by our survival after death, but if we were to reincarnate, we would not survive after death. This would mean that we would not be the same person in our next life, which seems problematic.

David Lewis is most closely associated with the functionalist theory of personal identity, which states that personal identity is constituted by our functional continuity.

The main objection to the functionalist theory of personal identity is that it is incompatible with the idea of brain transplantation. If we were to have our brain transplanted into another body, our functional continuity would be broken. This would mean that we would not be the same person after the brain transplantation, which seems problematic.

U.T. Place is most closely associated with the reductionist theory of personal identity, which states that personal identity is reducible to our physical and mental states.

The main objection to the reductionist theory of personal identity is that it is incompatible with the idea of free will. The theory states that personal identity is reducible to our physical and mental states, but these states are determined by our genes and environment. This means that we would not have free will, which seems problematic.

C.D. Broad is most closely associated with the emergentist theory of personal identity, which states that personal identity is an emergent property of our physical and mental states.

The main objection to the emergentist theory of personal identity is that it is incompatible with the idea of physicalism. Physicalism is the view that everything is ultimately physical. The emergentist theory of personal identity states that personal identity is an emergent property of our physical and mental states, but this is incompatible with physicalism because it implies that there is something non-physical about personal identity.