Reading Comprehension Test - 1

Which of the following statements is/are true as per the passage?

I. The world governments have to girdle up to meet the challenge of cattle menace.
II. Cattle are a greater source of global warming than all the acts of humans taken together.
III. India has almost one fifth of the world's cattle population.

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

It came as a shock to learn that the world’s cattle population of 1,530 million plays a bigger role in effecting global warming than all of the world’s cars taken together. This is no gimmick; a United Nations report not only makes such a shocking claim, but also backs it up with the requisite data.

Cattle also supplement the depletion of our forests and water bodies; this is mostly the case in developing countries where the number of cattle per human is high. The high proportion of cattle in developing countries is because the people there are dependent on cattle more than their counterparts in the west. As the population of the world multiplies at alarming rates, the stress on natural resources increases manifold. Dwindling of the natural resources is a prominent concern for all.

This United Nations report has ominous signs, especially for India, as the country proudly says that it has 18 per cent of the world’s cattle. Even with the presence of sacred and holy attachments towards cattle, their numbers are diminishing. Vastly considered a taboo, government figures indicate that conscious culling of cattle is widespread all through the sub-continent. This, of course, has lead to a steady decrease in the number of cattle. A big portion of the total cattle population in such countries is old, sterile and is left to die of hunger. When they wander onto a farm, they are mercilessly beaten. Some lucky or unlucky ones, depending on your perspective, die a peaceful death from poisonous substances or after asphyxiating from plastic bags. The carcasses are of no use and are left on their own.

Despite of all the facts which advocate the reduction in the number of cattles, it is quite improbable that we will see any policies, such as a "flatulence tax" put into effect by the politicians; policies which may help both the cattle and humans in the long run.

Which of the following statements can be directly derived from the passage?

I. Cattle slaughter is widespread in India despite the moral and religious sentiments.
II. The old and infirm livestock is a bane for countries like India and a strain on their fragile economy.
III. The steep increase in the rate of human population increase is no less a cause of concern.

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

It came as a shock to learn that the world’s cattle population of 1,530 million plays a bigger role in effecting global warming than all of the world’s cars taken together. This is no gimmick; a United Nations report not only makes such a shocking claim, but also backs it up with the requisite data.

Cattle also supplement the depletion of our forests and water bodies; this is mostly the case in developing countries where the number of cattle per human is high. The high proportion of cattle in developing countries is because the people there are dependent on cattle more than their counterparts in the west. As the population of the world multiplies at alarming rates, the stress on natural resources increases manifold. Dwindling of the natural resources is a prominent concern for all.

This United Nations report has ominous signs, especially for India, as the country proudly says that it has 18 per cent of the world’s cattle. Even with the presence of sacred and holy attachments towards cattle, their numbers are diminishing. Vastly considered a taboo, government figures indicate that conscious culling of cattle is widespread all through the sub-continent. This, of course, has lead to a steady decrease in the number of cattle. A big portion of the total cattle population in such countries is old, sterile and is left to die of hunger. When they wander onto a farm, they are mercilessly beaten. Some lucky or unlucky ones, depending on your perspective, die a peaceful death from poisonous substances or after asphyxiating from plastic bags. The carcasses are of no use and are left on their own.

Despite of all the facts which advocate the reduction in the number of cattles, it is quite improbable that we will see any policies, such as a "flatulence tax" put into effect by the politicians; policies which may help both the cattle and humans in the long run.

The information in the passage suggests that the author would regard which of the following actions by the management of Company X as potentially harmful to the company's shareholders?

Directions: Answer the question based on the following passage.

The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called antitakeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares' value.

But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing hard to get may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, antitakeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.

Which of the following options cannot be inferred from the passage about managements of target firms prior to the current takeover frenzy?

1. They used more imaginative tactics to resist takeovers.
2. They were more concerned about shareholders' interests.
3. They rarely took strong action to resist takeover attempts.

Directions: Answer the question based on the following passage.

The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called antitakeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares' value.

But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing hard to get may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, antitakeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.

The author of the passage would agree with which of the following ______.

1. the armed forces deployed in the state have acted with impunity
2. the protests against the Manorama incident actually represent the bottled up rage of the people
3. a new political strategy has to be evolved to deal with the situation at hand
4. the AFSPA has been the primary cause of alienation among the people in the state

Directions: Answer the question based on the following passage.

The unabated protests in Manipur over the death in custody of Thangjam Manoroma Devi show that the Centre and the State Government need to address the situation with measures that go beyond token gestures. Thirty–two–year–old Manoroma was found shot dead a few hours after her arrest by personnel of the Assam Rifles on the suspicion that she was an activist of the secessionist People's Liberation Army.

The Manoroma incident is not the first of its kind. Going by the number of atrocities reported, the security forces deployed in the State seem to conduct themselves with total impunity. In this, they are enabled by the Armed Forces (Manipur and Assam) Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1958, amended in 1972, and in force in the whole of Manipur since 1980. This gives the security forces not just extraordinary powers but also uncommon protection. Once an area is declared disturbed under the Act, an officer of any rank, including a non–commissioned officer, can enter and search a place without a warrant, destroy it, and carry out an arrest on reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence! It allows the killing of a person who in the opinion of the officer violates prohibitory orders. But the most shocking aspect of the Act is this: it shuts out avenues of redress by barring all legal proceedings against security forces personnel without the prior sanction of the Central Government. The Act was brought in to deal with the insurgency in the State, but its sweeping provisions have only led to a long list of human rights violations by the security forces, worsening the sense of alienation among the people of the State and fuelling the insurgency.

The protests against the Manoroma incident are in reality an explosion of years of bottled–up rage against the actions that are covered up by this Act. It is the responsibility of the Centre to ensure that the situation does not deteriorate any further. Without doubt, the solution to the present problem in Manipur lies in taking a close and honest look at the draconian provisions of the Act and devising a political strategy to deal with the insurgency instead of depending on the armed forces to sort it out.

Which of the following options can be inferred about AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act) from the passage?

1. The act provides extraordinary powers only to all officers.
2. The Supreme Court asked the state government to repeal the act.
3. Rather than controlling the insurgency, AFSPA has fuelled the insurgency.
4. The act has been somewhat successful in curtailing the insurgency.

Directions: Answer the question based on the following passage.

The unabated protests in Manipur over the death in custody of Thangjam Manoroma Devi show that the Centre and the State Government need to address the situation with measures that go beyond token gestures. Thirty–two–year–old Manoroma was found shot dead a few hours after her arrest by personnel of the Assam Rifles on the suspicion that she was an activist of the secessionist People's Liberation Army.

The Manoroma incident is not the first of its kind. Going by the number of atrocities reported, the security forces deployed in the State seem to conduct themselves with total impunity. In this, they are enabled by the Armed Forces (Manipur and Assam) Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1958, amended in 1972, and in force in the whole of Manipur since 1980. This gives the security forces not just extraordinary powers but also uncommon protection. Once an area is declared disturbed under the Act, an officer of any rank, including a non–commissioned officer, can enter and search a place without a warrant, destroy it, and carry out an arrest on reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence! It allows the killing of a person who in the opinion of the officer violates prohibitory orders. But the most shocking aspect of the Act is this: it shuts out avenues of redress by barring all legal proceedings against security forces personnel without the prior sanction of the Central Government. The Act was brought in to deal with the insurgency in the State, but its sweeping provisions have only led to a long list of human rights violations by the security forces, worsening the sense of alienation among the people of the State and fuelling the insurgency.

The protests against the Manoroma incident are in reality an explosion of years of bottled–up rage against the actions that are covered up by this Act. It is the responsibility of the Centre to ensure that the situation does not deteriorate any further. Without doubt, the solution to the present problem in Manipur lies in taking a close and honest look at the draconian provisions of the Act and devising a political strategy to deal with the insurgency instead of depending on the armed forces to sort it out.

The author mentions studies of negotiated mergers in the second paragraph in order to ______.

Directions: Answer the question based on the following passage.

The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called antitakeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares' value.

But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing hard to get may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, antitakeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.

The author regards the studies mentioned in the second paragraph as misleading. Which of the following reasons are not responsible for that?

1. They employ an overly restrictive time frame.
2. They look only at return to shareholders.
3. They do not examine hostile takeovers.

Directions: Answer the question based on the following passage.

The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called antitakeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares' value.

But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing hard to get may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, antitakeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.

The author suggests that many commentators on mergers would agree with which of the following views?

1. The current trend towards greater corporate consolidation cannot continue indefinitely at its present pace.
2. The current climate of acquisition favours the interests of management over those of the shareholder.
3. The social consequences of the current takeover frenzy far outweigh any possible economic benefits.
4. Antitakeover tactics are justified only when attempts at a negotiated merger have failed.

Directions: Answer the question based on the following passage.

The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called antitakeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares' value.

But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing hard to get may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, antitakeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.

Which of the following options, if true, would most seriously weaken the author's conclusion about the benefits of management resistance to takeovers?

1. A third category of mergers, comprising firms that underwent several unsuccessful bids before being acquired, shows a rate of return to shareholders somewhere between the rates for the other two categories.
2. When acquisitions are studied over a two-year period, companies that resisted takeover attempts show the same return to shareholders as companies that did not resist.
3. The 56 per cent return to shareholders earned when companies are acquired after an unsuccessful takeover bid, is an average that includes companies whose stock declined in value as well as companies whose stock gained in value.
4. Of the companies whose managements resisted acquisition attempts, about fifty per cent experienced an increase in stock prices and fifty per cent suffered a decrease in stock prices.

Directions: Answer the question based on the following passage.

The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called antitakeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares' value.

But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing hard to get may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, antitakeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.

Which among the followings is/are the extraordinary powers provided by the AFSPA?
I. Power to kill a person suspected of violating prohibitory orders, anywhere.
II. No legal proceedings against security forces personnel.
III. Power to enter and search any place.

Directions: Answer the question based on the following passage.

The unabated protests in Manipur over the death in custody of Thangjam Manoroma Devi show that the Centre and the State Government need to address the situation with measures that go beyond token gestures. Thirty–two–year–old Manoroma was found shot dead a few hours after her arrest by personnel of the Assam Rifles on the suspicion that she was an activist of the secessionist People's Liberation Army.

The Manoroma incident is not the first of its kind. Going by the number of atrocities reported, the security forces deployed in the State seem to conduct themselves with total impunity. In this, they are enabled by the Armed Forces (Manipur and Assam) Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1958, amended in 1972, and in force in the whole of Manipur since 1980. This gives the security forces not just extraordinary powers but also uncommon protection. Once an area is declared disturbed under the Act, an officer of any rank, including a non–commissioned officer, can enter and search a place without a warrant, destroy it, and carry out an arrest on reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence! It allows the killing of a person who in the opinion of the officer violates prohibitory orders. But the most shocking aspect of the Act is this: it shuts out avenues of redress by barring all legal proceedings against security forces personnel without the prior sanction of the Central Government. The Act was brought in to deal with the insurgency in the State, but its sweeping provisions have only led to a long list of human rights violations by the security forces, worsening the sense of alienation among the people of the State and fuelling the insurgency.

The protests against the Manoroma incident are in reality an explosion of years of bottled–up rage against the actions that are covered up by this Act. It is the responsibility of the Centre to ensure that the situation does not deteriorate any further. Without doubt, the solution to the present problem in Manipur lies in taking a close and honest look at the draconian provisions of the Act and devising a political strategy to deal with the insurgency instead of depending on the armed forces to sort it out.

According to the passage, under which of the following conditions firms on the average yield the greatest return to their shareholders?

1. When they decline any initial offer from a second bidder.
2. When they resist all takeover attempts.
3. When they are successfully acquired on the initial takeover bid.
4. When they are acquired by another bidder after an initial unsuccessful takeover bidder.

Directions: Answer the question based on the following passage.

The 1980s have come to be regarded as the decade of corporate consolidation in the United States, with the number of mergers and their dollar value both setting records. Many public forums have questioned, on both social and economic grounds, the merits of this takeover frenzy. Even more controversial than the mergers themselves, however, is the reaction of the management of target firms. No longer is management content to be passive or to put up minimal resistance in the face of an unwelcome takeover attempt. Indeed, the responses of target managements have become as imaginative as the methods used by the would–be acquirers. These so–called antitakeover tactics have received nearly universal condemnation from government regulatory bodies, the financial press, and some academic publications. Why is there so much criticism when management resists takeovers? At the most general level, such criticism is based on studies that find a negative return to shareholders when a negotiated (friendly) merger is unsuccessful. These studies examine the cumulative return from the period just prior to the first public announcement of the proposed merger through the announcement of cancellation. Results range from a total return of –9.02 per cent to + 3.68 per cent, with an average of –2.88 percent. In unsuccessful mergers, therefore, stockholders in target firms lose on average nearly 3 per cent of the shares' value.

But looking at the returns only through the termination date can be misleading. Other studies examining the period from six months prior to an offer to six months after the offer have found that the total return averages nearly +36 per cent, even though the offer was unsuccessful. Given the typical stock market reaction to unsuccessful negotiated mergers, this is a curious finding. The explanation for this seeming anomaly emerges when firms are divided into two groups: those eventually acquired by some other bidder, and those not acquired. Firms that were not acquired eventually lost the entire 36 per cent return. But firms subsequently acquired, earned an additional 20 per cent return above the initial 36 per cent, earning shareholders a total return of 56 per cent. Those earnings compare favorably to the overall average return of 30 percent earned by shareholders & of all companies successfully acquired. These results suggest that some form of resistance by management may be desirable. Playing hard to get may influence the initial suitor to increase the bid, or it may permit time for competing bids to be submitted. It is possible, however, to have too much of a good thing. When management actions are designed solely to eliminate a takeover by a specific bidder, then shareholders may be harmed. Nevertheless, antitakeover tactics do not deserve the blanket condemnation they receive in the press.