Reading Comprehension

Some of the prime infirmities that the passage seems to suffer from are because

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

A philosopher once remarked that the difference between a bee and an architect is that the architect, unlike the bee, erects a structure in the mind before translating it into reality. Human civilization has taken considerable time to attain the stage of the architect. However, having got there, the contours of human evolution are determined by a continuous clash of ideas in all spheres of endeavor. The philosophical divide between materialism and idealism is often erroneously portrayed as matter versus mind. It is, in fact, a battle between the mind or consciousness as the highest form of matter and consciousness independent of the human body and, in that sense, cosmic in nature. While advances in modern science from astrophysics micro-genetic engineering reconfirm the former, the battle between sects of ideas, or ideology, continues to shape advances in every field. The answer to Descarte’s famous postulate ‘I think, therefore, I am’ is ‘I am, therefore, I think’.      
Ideology represents the structure of ideas that seeks to influence the course of human development. It not merely remains relevant, but also becomes pivotal in shaping the future. Presuming that the goal of humanity is to seek emancipation from all forms of bondage, the realization of that quest lies in Marxism.
Marxism is unique in that it can be transcended only when its agenda is realized. This is because its understanding of capitalism is by itself thorough enough for it to comprehend the historical possibilities that lie beyond it. Hence Marxism will be rendered superfluous only when capitalism, the object of its analysis, is itself superseded.
Put another way, the uniqueness of Marxism lies in the fact that all so-called theoretical advances, which supposedly render it obsolete, actually represent throwbacks to still earlier theories superseded by it. Alternatively, these are exaggerations of some particular aspects inherent in Marxism, but dressed in a new garb. These should properly be assimilated within Marxism. ‘Post-modernist’ or ‘post-Marxist’ theories which, at their best, emphasize a moral–ethical stance on social issues, represent pre-Marxist notions of social reformism, egalitarianism or progressive interventionism. On the other hand, certain reformist theories like Keynesianism, based on insights into the functioning of the capitalist economy, unknowingly recall insights actually contained in though not adequately developed within Marxism. It is not surprising that the Polish economist Michael Kalecki, by training an engineer whose only introduction to economics was Marx’s Capital, independently arrived at the so-called Keynesian Revolution.
Marx was not unique on account of subjective qualities that made him superior to other thinkers. What was remarkable was his approach to the analysis of capitalism and the unearthing of certain tendencies that he said were ‘immanent’ in capitalist social relations. The capitalist systems function in a manner that is not merely independent of the will and consciousness of its participants. Indeed, it makes the participants, whether capitalists or workers, victims of ‘alienation’ and mere personifications of the elements through which its inherent logic works itself out.

The author says Marxism will become superfluous only when capitalism is superseded. What does he want to say?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

A philosopher once remarked that the difference between a bee and an architect is that the architect, unlike the bee, erects a structure in the mind before translating it into reality. Human civilization has taken considerable time to attain the stage of the architect. However, having got there, the contours of human evolution are determined by a continuous clash of ideas in all spheres of endeavor. The philosophical divide between materialism and idealism is often erroneously portrayed as matter versus mind. It is, in fact, a battle between the mind or consciousness as the highest form of matter and consciousness independent of the human body and, in that sense, cosmic in nature. While advances in modern science from astrophysics micro-genetic engineering reconfirm the former, the battle between sects of ideas, or ideology, continues to shape advances in every field. The answer to Descarte’s famous postulate ‘I think, therefore, I am’ is ‘I am, therefore, I think’.      
Ideology represents the structure of ideas that seeks to influence the course of human development. It not merely remains relevant, but also becomes pivotal in shaping the future. Presuming that the goal of humanity is to seek emancipation from all forms of bondage, the realization of that quest lies in Marxism.
Marxism is unique in that it can be transcended only when its agenda is realized. This is because its understanding of capitalism is by itself thorough enough for it to comprehend the historical possibilities that lie beyond it. Hence Marxism will be rendered superfluous only when capitalism, the object of its analysis, is itself superseded.
Put another way, the uniqueness of Marxism lies in the fact that all so-called theoretical advances, which supposedly render it obsolete, actually represent throwbacks to still earlier theories superseded by it. Alternatively, these are exaggerations of some particular aspects inherent in Marxism, but dressed in a new garb. These should properly be assimilated within Marxism. ‘Post-modernist’ or ‘post-Marxist’ theories which, at their best, emphasize a moral–ethical stance on social issues, represent pre-Marxist notions of social reformism, egalitarianism or progressive interventionism. On the other hand, certain reformist theories like Keynesianism, based on insights into the functioning of the capitalist economy, unknowingly recall insights actually contained in though not adequately developed within Marxism. It is not surprising that the Polish economist Michael Kalecki, by training an engineer whose only introduction to economics was Marx’s Capital, independently arrived at the so-called Keynesian Revolution.
Marx was not unique on account of subjective qualities that made him superior to other thinkers. What was remarkable was his approach to the analysis of capitalism and the unearthing of certain tendencies that he said were ‘immanent’ in capitalist social relations. The capitalist systems function in a manner that is not merely independent of the will and consciousness of its participants. Indeed, it makes the participants, whether capitalists or workers, victims of ‘alienation’ and mere personifications of the elements through which its inherent logic works itself out.

According to the passage what separates bees from humans is

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

A philosopher once remarked that the difference between a bee and an architect is that the architect, unlike the bee, erects a structure in the mind before translating it into reality. Human civilization has taken considerable time to attain the stage of the architect. However, having got there, the contours of human evolution are determined by a continuous clash of ideas in all spheres of endeavor. The philosophical divide between materialism and idealism is often erroneously portrayed as matter versus mind. It is, in fact, a battle between the mind or consciousness as the highest form of matter and consciousness independent of the human body and, in that sense, cosmic in nature. While advances in modern science from astrophysics micro-genetic engineering reconfirm the former, the battle between sects of ideas, or ideology, continues to shape advances in every field. The answer to Descarte’s famous postulate ‘I think, therefore, I am’ is ‘I am, therefore, I think’.      
Ideology represents the structure of ideas that seeks to influence the course of human development. It not merely remains relevant, but also becomes pivotal in shaping the future. Presuming that the goal of humanity is to seek emancipation from all forms of bondage, the realization of that quest lies in Marxism.
Marxism is unique in that it can be transcended only when its agenda is realized. This is because its understanding of capitalism is by itself thorough enough for it to comprehend the historical possibilities that lie beyond it. Hence Marxism will be rendered superfluous only when capitalism, the object of its analysis, is itself superseded.
Put another way, the uniqueness of Marxism lies in the fact that all so-called theoretical advances, which supposedly render it obsolete, actually represent throwbacks to still earlier theories superseded by it. Alternatively, these are exaggerations of some particular aspects inherent in Marxism, but dressed in a new garb. These should properly be assimilated within Marxism. ‘Post-modernist’ or ‘post-Marxist’ theories which, at their best, emphasize a moral–ethical stance on social issues, represent pre-Marxist notions of social reformism, egalitarianism or progressive interventionism. On the other hand, certain reformist theories like Keynesianism, based on insights into the functioning of the capitalist economy, unknowingly recall insights actually contained in though not adequately developed within Marxism. It is not surprising that the Polish economist Michael Kalecki, by training an engineer whose only introduction to economics was Marx’s Capital, independently arrived at the so-called Keynesian Revolution.
Marx was not unique on account of subjective qualities that made him superior to other thinkers. What was remarkable was his approach to the analysis of capitalism and the unearthing of certain tendencies that he said were ‘immanent’ in capitalist social relations. The capitalist systems function in a manner that is not merely independent of the will and consciousness of its participants. Indeed, it makes the participants, whether capitalists or workers, victims of ‘alienation’ and mere personifications of the elements through which its inherent logic works itself out.

The writer hints at a common thread running through Aristotle's Poetics and Politics when in fact the two move on two different planes. Identify the common thread.

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The first claim of the Poetics on our attention, long before we come to the problematic passages, is that it is the earliest surviving treatise to record and distinguish systematically one poetic “kind” from another. In doing this, Aristotle was describing as he knew it in Greece where poets usually competed for prizes in this or that class or “kind”. We know that his Politics was founded on the study, in detail, of the history and constitutions of 158 Greek states, and there is a good reason to believe that the Poetics was preceded by a similar examination of Greek plays; we have to remember the number, richness and variety of the plays available to Aristotle, compared with the minute proportion of Greek plays that have survived to us. He took over the kinds of literature as he found them; and by perpetuating them left a framework of reference for all European criticism ever since.
For it is largely through Poetics, though not because of it, that the main poetic “kinds” are still distinguished, even in their very names, through all the literatures of Europe, as Tragedy, Comedy, Epic and Lyric. In the main European languages these words are taken over from Greek merely transliterated and adapted to the appropriate grammatical shape. Whatever later forms, or kinds, may have been since developed, these have persisted, and (what is more) these names are still in constant use in the critical judgement even of kinds of literature that were unknown to Aristotle. Thus, a medieval verse Romance can hardly be discussed without reference to, and comparison with, Epic; even if the reason for mentioning Epic is to point the differences. A modern fictional narrative in prose, usually in this country called a “novel” (from the Italian), but in French called a roman (with a throwback to medieval Romance)—even a novel can hardly be discussed without using the terms Tragedy, Comedy, Epic and Lyrics—or the adjectives derived from them—as the quickest means of suggesting its character, or certain qualities in its various parts, or some aspect of its purposes or treatment. Even in a state of European literature in which the “kinds” are not strictly adhered to, the traditional kinds as distinguished by Aristotle still have vitality in helping an author to define his own purposes and methods, and in helping a critic to interpret them.
Also, quite apart from these words, which have been transliterated into the European languages, nearly all the leading critical ideas and distinctions used by Aristotle have been translated and still have a vital currency. Confining ourselves to dramatic criticism only, consider merely the terms plot, character, complication, denouement, episode, chorus, unity of action (to go no further), and ask how criticism could proceed without them. One of the main reasons why the Poetics should be read at the very beginning of a university course in literature is that it shows these essential current terms in their earliest formal context, related to a literature that one can read, at least in translation.
That word ‘related’ is very important. It is a means of accustoming oneself from the beginning to the fact that critical terms are relative, not absolute; that they need examination (not only in Aristotle but always, everywhere) in the light of the literature to which they refer and of the special purposes for which the critic himself is using them. This is just as true of modern criticism now—even of book-reviews in the weekly press—as it is of Aristotle himself, or, say, of Sidney or Dryden. Even though the words may remain in constant use in the same language, unchanged in form, yet their exact reference to the literature, and the nuance which they imply to the mind of the critic who uses them, may change, and frequently do change. The language of criticism is not a permanent, fixed, scientific vocabulary which, when once learnt, has merely to be correctly applied. It is constantly shifting; and it is the business of a trained mind, in writing or thinking of literature, to be alert to its shifts when they appear in the works of others, and to use the terms themselves carefully and studiously, in order that, so far as may be, the resulting criticism may make apparent the sense in which its own terminology is to be understood. That is the ideal; even if it is an ideal which scarcely any critic has ever attained.

This essay on Aristotle's Poetics is

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The first claim of the Poetics on our attention, long before we come to the problematic passages, is that it is the earliest surviving treatise to record and distinguish systematically one poetic “kind” from another. In doing this, Aristotle was describing as he knew it in Greece where poets usually competed for prizes in this or that class or “kind”. We know that his Politics was founded on the study, in detail, of the history and constitutions of 158 Greek states, and there is a good reason to believe that the Poetics was preceded by a similar examination of Greek plays; we have to remember the number, richness and variety of the plays available to Aristotle, compared with the minute proportion of Greek plays that have survived to us. He took over the kinds of literature as he found them; and by perpetuating them left a framework of reference for all European criticism ever since.
For it is largely through Poetics, though not because of it, that the main poetic “kinds” are still distinguished, even in their very names, through all the literatures of Europe, as Tragedy, Comedy, Epic and Lyric. In the main European languages these words are taken over from Greek merely transliterated and adapted to the appropriate grammatical shape. Whatever later forms, or kinds, may have been since developed, these have persisted, and (what is more) these names are still in constant use in the critical judgement even of kinds of literature that were unknown to Aristotle. Thus, a medieval verse Romance can hardly be discussed without reference to, and comparison with, Epic; even if the reason for mentioning Epic is to point the differences. A modern fictional narrative in prose, usually in this country called a “novel” (from the Italian), but in French called a roman (with a throwback to medieval Romance)—even a novel can hardly be discussed without using the terms Tragedy, Comedy, Epic and Lyrics—or the adjectives derived from them—as the quickest means of suggesting its character, or certain qualities in its various parts, or some aspect of its purposes or treatment. Even in a state of European literature in which the “kinds” are not strictly adhered to, the traditional kinds as distinguished by Aristotle still have vitality in helping an author to define his own purposes and methods, and in helping a critic to interpret them.
Also, quite apart from these words, which have been transliterated into the European languages, nearly all the leading critical ideas and distinctions used by Aristotle have been translated and still have a vital currency. Confining ourselves to dramatic criticism only, consider merely the terms plot, character, complication, denouement, episode, chorus, unity of action (to go no further), and ask how criticism could proceed without them. One of the main reasons why the Poetics should be read at the very beginning of a university course in literature is that it shows these essential current terms in their earliest formal context, related to a literature that one can read, at least in translation.
That word ‘related’ is very important. It is a means of accustoming oneself from the beginning to the fact that critical terms are relative, not absolute; that they need examination (not only in Aristotle but always, everywhere) in the light of the literature to which they refer and of the special purposes for which the critic himself is using them. This is just as true of modern criticism now—even of book-reviews in the weekly press—as it is of Aristotle himself, or, say, of Sidney or Dryden. Even though the words may remain in constant use in the same language, unchanged in form, yet their exact reference to the literature, and the nuance which they imply to the mind of the critic who uses them, may change, and frequently do change. The language of criticism is not a permanent, fixed, scientific vocabulary which, when once learnt, has merely to be correctly applied. It is constantly shifting; and it is the business of a trained mind, in writing or thinking of literature, to be alert to its shifts when they appear in the works of others, and to use the terms themselves carefully and studiously, in order that, so far as may be, the resulting criticism may make apparent the sense in which its own terminology is to be understood. That is the ideal; even if it is an ideal which scarcely any critic has ever attained.

What can definitely not be inferred from the passage is that

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The first claim of the Poetics on our attention, long before we come to the problematic passages, is that it is the earliest surviving treatise to record and distinguish systematically one poetic “kind” from another. In doing this, Aristotle was describing as he knew it in Greece where poets usually competed for prizes in this or that class or “kind”. We know that his Politics was founded on the study, in detail, of the history and constitutions of 158 Greek states, and there is a good reason to believe that the Poetics was preceded by a similar examination of Greek plays; we have to remember the number, richness and variety of the plays available to Aristotle, compared with the minute proportion of Greek plays that have survived to us. He took over the kinds of literature as he found them; and by perpetuating them left a framework of reference for all European criticism ever since.
For it is largely through Poetics, though not because of it, that the main poetic “kinds” are still distinguished, even in their very names, through all the literatures of Europe, as Tragedy, Comedy, Epic and Lyric. In the main European languages these words are taken over from Greek merely transliterated and adapted to the appropriate grammatical shape. Whatever later forms, or kinds, may have been since developed, these have persisted, and (what is more) these names are still in constant use in the critical judgement even of kinds of literature that were unknown to Aristotle. Thus, a medieval verse Romance can hardly be discussed without reference to, and comparison with, Epic; even if the reason for mentioning Epic is to point the differences. A modern fictional narrative in prose, usually in this country called a “novel” (from the Italian), but in French called a roman (with a throwback to medieval Romance)—even a novel can hardly be discussed without using the terms Tragedy, Comedy, Epic and Lyrics—or the adjectives derived from them—as the quickest means of suggesting its character, or certain qualities in its various parts, or some aspect of its purposes or treatment. Even in a state of European literature in which the “kinds” are not strictly adhered to, the traditional kinds as distinguished by Aristotle still have vitality in helping an author to define his own purposes and methods, and in helping a critic to interpret them.
Also, quite apart from these words, which have been transliterated into the European languages, nearly all the leading critical ideas and distinctions used by Aristotle have been translated and still have a vital currency. Confining ourselves to dramatic criticism only, consider merely the terms plot, character, complication, denouement, episode, chorus, unity of action (to go no further), and ask how criticism could proceed without them. One of the main reasons why the Poetics should be read at the very beginning of a university course in literature is that it shows these essential current terms in their earliest formal context, related to a literature that one can read, at least in translation.
That word ‘related’ is very important. It is a means of accustoming oneself from the beginning to the fact that critical terms are relative, not absolute; that they need examination (not only in Aristotle but always, everywhere) in the light of the literature to which they refer and of the special purposes for which the critic himself is using them. This is just as true of modern criticism now—even of book-reviews in the weekly press—as it is of Aristotle himself, or, say, of Sidney or Dryden. Even though the words may remain in constant use in the same language, unchanged in form, yet their exact reference to the literature, and the nuance which they imply to the mind of the critic who uses them, may change, and frequently do change. The language of criticism is not a permanent, fixed, scientific vocabulary which, when once learnt, has merely to be correctly applied. It is constantly shifting; and it is the business of a trained mind, in writing or thinking of literature, to be alert to its shifts when they appear in the works of others, and to use the terms themselves carefully and studiously, in order that, so far as may be, the resulting criticism may make apparent the sense in which its own terminology is to be understood. That is the ideal; even if it is an ideal which scarcely any critic has ever attained.

The writer says 'critical terms are relative, not absolute.' Is that what the passage leads to?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The first claim of the Poetics on our attention, long before we come to the problematic passages, is that it is the earliest surviving treatise to record and distinguish systematically one poetic “kind” from another. In doing this, Aristotle was describing as he knew it in Greece where poets usually competed for prizes in this or that class or “kind”. We know that his Politics was founded on the study, in detail, of the history and constitutions of 158 Greek states, and there is a good reason to believe that the Poetics was preceded by a similar examination of Greek plays; we have to remember the number, richness and variety of the plays available to Aristotle, compared with the minute proportion of Greek plays that have survived to us. He took over the kinds of literature as he found them; and by perpetuating them left a framework of reference for all European criticism ever since.
For it is largely through Poetics, though not because of it, that the main poetic “kinds” are still distinguished, even in their very names, through all the literatures of Europe, as Tragedy, Comedy, Epic and Lyric. In the main European languages these words are taken over from Greek merely transliterated and adapted to the appropriate grammatical shape. Whatever later forms, or kinds, may have been since developed, these have persisted, and (what is more) these names are still in constant use in the critical judgement even of kinds of literature that were unknown to Aristotle. Thus, a medieval verse Romance can hardly be discussed without reference to, and comparison with, Epic; even if the reason for mentioning Epic is to point the differences. A modern fictional narrative in prose, usually in this country called a “novel” (from the Italian), but in French called a roman (with a throwback to medieval Romance)—even a novel can hardly be discussed without using the terms Tragedy, Comedy, Epic and Lyrics—or the adjectives derived from them—as the quickest means of suggesting its character, or certain qualities in its various parts, or some aspect of its purposes or treatment. Even in a state of European literature in which the “kinds” are not strictly adhered to, the traditional kinds as distinguished by Aristotle still have vitality in helping an author to define his own purposes and methods, and in helping a critic to interpret them.
Also, quite apart from these words, which have been transliterated into the European languages, nearly all the leading critical ideas and distinctions used by Aristotle have been translated and still have a vital currency. Confining ourselves to dramatic criticism only, consider merely the terms plot, character, complication, denouement, episode, chorus, unity of action (to go no further), and ask how criticism could proceed without them. One of the main reasons why the Poetics should be read at the very beginning of a university course in literature is that it shows these essential current terms in their earliest formal context, related to a literature that one can read, at least in translation.
That word ‘related’ is very important. It is a means of accustoming oneself from the beginning to the fact that critical terms are relative, not absolute; that they need examination (not only in Aristotle but always, everywhere) in the light of the literature to which they refer and of the special purposes for which the critic himself is using them. This is just as true of modern criticism now—even of book-reviews in the weekly press—as it is of Aristotle himself, or, say, of Sidney or Dryden. Even though the words may remain in constant use in the same language, unchanged in form, yet their exact reference to the literature, and the nuance which they imply to the mind of the critic who uses them, may change, and frequently do change. The language of criticism is not a permanent, fixed, scientific vocabulary which, when once learnt, has merely to be correctly applied. It is constantly shifting; and it is the business of a trained mind, in writing or thinking of literature, to be alert to its shifts when they appear in the works of others, and to use the terms themselves carefully and studiously, in order that, so far as may be, the resulting criticism may make apparent the sense in which its own terminology is to be understood. That is the ideal; even if it is an ideal which scarcely any critic has ever attained.

Even a cursory glance through the passage shows that some of the assumptions made by the author are appalling. What appears to be the most appalling of them all?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

A philosopher once remarked that the difference between a bee and an architect is that the architect, unlike the bee, erects a structure in the mind before translating it into reality. Human civilization has taken considerable time to attain the stage of the architect. However, having got there, the contours of human evolution are determined by a continuous clash of ideas in all spheres of endeavor. The philosophical divide between materialism and idealism is often erroneously portrayed as matter versus mind. It is, in fact, a battle between the mind or consciousness as the highest form of matter and consciousness independent of the human body and, in that sense, cosmic in nature. While advances in modern science from astrophysics micro-genetic engineering reconfirm the former, the battle between sects of ideas, or ideology, continues to shape advances in every field. The answer to Descarte’s famous postulate ‘I think, therefore, I am’ is ‘I am, therefore, I think’.      
Ideology represents the structure of ideas that seeks to influence the course of human development. It not merely remains relevant, but also becomes pivotal in shaping the future. Presuming that the goal of humanity is to seek emancipation from all forms of bondage, the realization of that quest lies in Marxism.
Marxism is unique in that it can be transcended only when its agenda is realized. This is because its understanding of capitalism is by itself thorough enough for it to comprehend the historical possibilities that lie beyond it. Hence Marxism will be rendered superfluous only when capitalism, the object of its analysis, is itself superseded.
Put another way, the uniqueness of Marxism lies in the fact that all so-called theoretical advances, which supposedly render it obsolete, actually represent throwbacks to still earlier theories superseded by it. Alternatively, these are exaggerations of some particular aspects inherent in Marxism, but dressed in a new garb. These should properly be assimilated within Marxism. ‘Post-modernist’ or ‘post-Marxist’ theories which, at their best, emphasize a moral–ethical stance on social issues, represent pre-Marxist notions of social reformism, egalitarianism or progressive interventionism. On the other hand, certain reformist theories like Keynesianism, based on insights into the functioning of the capitalist economy, unknowingly recall insights actually contained in though not adequately developed within Marxism. It is not surprising that the Polish economist Michael Kalecki, by training an engineer whose only introduction to economics was Marx’s Capital, independently arrived at the so-called Keynesian Revolution.
Marx was not unique on account of subjective qualities that made him superior to other thinkers. What was remarkable was his approach to the analysis of capitalism and the unearthing of certain tendencies that he said were ‘immanent’ in capitalist social relations. The capitalist systems function in a manner that is not merely independent of the will and consciousness of its participants. Indeed, it makes the participants, whether capitalists or workers, victims of ‘alienation’ and mere personifications of the elements through which its inherent logic works itself out.

'The first claim of the Poetics on our attention is that it is the earliest surviving treatise to record and distinguish systematically one poetic “kind” from another,' says the author. If there is first claim, should there not be a second claim? Identify it.

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The first claim of the Poetics on our attention, long before we come to the problematic passages, is that it is the earliest surviving treatise to record and distinguish systematically one poetic “kind” from another. In doing this, Aristotle was describing as he knew it in Greece where poets usually competed for prizes in this or that class or “kind”. We know that his Politics was founded on the study, in detail, of the history and constitutions of 158 Greek states, and there is a good reason to believe that the Poetics was preceded by a similar examination of Greek plays; we have to remember the number, richness and variety of the plays available to Aristotle, compared with the minute proportion of Greek plays that have survived to us. He took over the kinds of literature as he found them; and by perpetuating them left a framework of reference for all European criticism ever since.
For it is largely through Poetics, though not because of it, that the main poetic “kinds” are still distinguished, even in their very names, through all the literatures of Europe, as Tragedy, Comedy, Epic and Lyric. In the main European languages these words are taken over from Greek merely transliterated and adapted to the appropriate grammatical shape. Whatever later forms, or kinds, may have been since developed, these have persisted, and (what is more) these names are still in constant use in the critical judgement even of kinds of literature that were unknown to Aristotle. Thus, a medieval verse Romance can hardly be discussed without reference to, and comparison with, Epic; even if the reason for mentioning Epic is to point the differences. A modern fictional narrative in prose, usually in this country called a “novel” (from the Italian), but in French called a roman (with a throwback to medieval Romance)—even a novel can hardly be discussed without using the terms Tragedy, Comedy, Epic and Lyrics—or the adjectives derived from them—as the quickest means of suggesting its character, or certain qualities in its various parts, or some aspect of its purposes or treatment. Even in a state of European literature in which the “kinds” are not strictly adhered to, the traditional kinds as distinguished by Aristotle still have vitality in helping an author to define his own purposes and methods, and in helping a critic to interpret them.
Also, quite apart from these words, which have been transliterated into the European languages, nearly all the leading critical ideas and distinctions used by Aristotle have been translated and still have a vital currency. Confining ourselves to dramatic criticism only, consider merely the terms plot, character, complication, denouement, episode, chorus, unity of action (to go no further), and ask how criticism could proceed without them. One of the main reasons why the Poetics should be read at the very beginning of a university course in literature is that it shows these essential current terms in their earliest formal context, related to a literature that one can read, at least in translation.
That word ‘related’ is very important. It is a means of accustoming oneself from the beginning to the fact that critical terms are relative, not absolute; that they need examination (not only in Aristotle but always, everywhere) in the light of the literature to which they refer and of the special purposes for which the critic himself is using them. This is just as true of modern criticism now—even of book-reviews in the weekly press—as it is of Aristotle himself, or, say, of Sidney or Dryden. Even though the words may remain in constant use in the same language, unchanged in form, yet their exact reference to the literature, and the nuance which they imply to the mind of the critic who uses them, may change, and frequently do change. The language of criticism is not a permanent, fixed, scientific vocabulary which, when once learnt, has merely to be correctly applied. It is constantly shifting; and it is the business of a trained mind, in writing or thinking of literature, to be alert to its shifts when they appear in the works of others, and to use the terms themselves carefully and studiously, in order that, so far as may be, the resulting criticism may make apparent the sense in which its own terminology is to be understood. That is the ideal; even if it is an ideal which scarcely any critic has ever attained.

Is the electronic media a monster that needs to be tamed?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The closure of the popular tabloid, News of the World, the arrest of the top executives of the Rupert Murdoch-run News International on phone hacking charges and the proceedings of the Leveson inquiry have focussed attention on the skewed internal workings of an otherwise vibrant British media. This has resulted in a bizarre turning of the tables. A readership accustomed to viewing the media as white knights in shining armour puncturing the pretensions of the powerful and the pompous has suddenly been exposed to unethical practices, blatant illegalities and the cosy relationship that exists between the fourth estate and politicians. 
The results have not been edifying. In the past, the media conducted themselves with the militant cussedness of trade unions. Every right was fiercely guarded and transformed into a privilege; every hint of regulation was instantly transformed into a larger battle for democracy; and the occasional statement on accountability was painted as an insidious assault on the people’s inalienable right to know.
The boot is now on the other foot. Instead of being assiduously wooed and flattered by the powerful, the Leveson inquiry has witnessed powerful media barons such as Rupert Murdoch and his son, James, being subjected to merciless interrogation. Indeed, as the inquiry meanders from the internal workings of the newsrooms to politics, the likes of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, are having a torrid time explaining their convivial relations with the Murdoch empire. Hostile public opinion is veering to the opinion that existing laws and quasi-official bodies such as the Press Complaints Commission aren’t enough. What the media need is a public-spirited, independent regulator.
It is difficult to gauge whether or not the chairman of Press Council, Markandey Katju, was influenced by developments in London when he rushed into battle against India’s ‘unionized’ media. A high-spirited individual with very definite (and occasionally bizarre) views on all subjects ranging from Salman Rushdie’s writings to cricket’s role as a promoter of false consciousness, the retired Supreme Court judge has proffered a simple argument: if all professions are regulated, why should media be any different? Waging a turf battle against the electronic-media-appointed watchdog body headed by the former chief justice, J.S.Verma, Katju has strongly argued that the Press Council be transformed into a Media Council and assume the role of a regulator.
Katju, it would seem, had very definite ideas about editorial content and the hierarchy of news. In his perception, the media must play the role of social reformers and not fritter away their eagerness in frivolity and tittle-tattle, never mind the fact that not all their consumers are preoccupied with virtuousness. It is precisely because of his highbrow certitudes and disdain for popular journalism that his insistence on a media regulator has been viewed with a measure of amusement by the fourth estate.
If an all powerful regulator in the mould of Katju, it has been argued, assumed responsibility for the whole media, it would be tantamount to murdering diversity and ruining a vibrant and growing industry. In spelling out his philosophical preferences robustly, Katju unwittingly helped focus attention on the dangers posed by an activist regulator who would replicate the ideals of the so-called New Information Order, once favoured by the fellow travellers of the Soviet Union.

Which of the following can be inferred about media from this report?

1. it is a growing industry that would not want to be fettered.
2. it embodies the principles of freedom of expression.
3. free news is more important than controlled news.
4. a regulated media cannot be the fourth estate.

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The closure of the popular tabloid, News of the World, the arrest of the top executives of the Rupert Murdoch-run News International on phone hacking charges and the proceedings of the Leveson inquiry have focussed attention on the skewed internal workings of an otherwise vibrant British media. This has resulted in a bizarre turning of the tables. A readership accustomed to viewing the media as white knights in shining armour puncturing the pretensions of the powerful and the pompous has suddenly been exposed to unethical practices, blatant illegalities and the cosy relationship that exists between the fourth estate and politicians. 
The results have not been edifying. In the past, the media conducted themselves with the militant cussedness of trade unions. Every right was fiercely guarded and transformed into a privilege; every hint of regulation was instantly transformed into a larger battle for democracy; and the occasional statement on accountability was painted as an insidious assault on the people’s inalienable right to know.
The boot is now on the other foot. Instead of being assiduously wooed and flattered by the powerful, the Leveson inquiry has witnessed powerful media barons such as Rupert Murdoch and his son, James, being subjected to merciless interrogation. Indeed, as the inquiry meanders from the internal workings of the newsrooms to politics, the likes of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, are having a torrid time explaining their convivial relations with the Murdoch empire. Hostile public opinion is veering to the opinion that existing laws and quasi-official bodies such as the Press Complaints Commission aren’t enough. What the media need is a public-spirited, independent regulator.
It is difficult to gauge whether or not the chairman of Press Council, Markandey Katju, was influenced by developments in London when he rushed into battle against India’s ‘unionized’ media. A high-spirited individual with very definite (and occasionally bizarre) views on all subjects ranging from Salman Rushdie’s writings to cricket’s role as a promoter of false consciousness, the retired Supreme Court judge has proffered a simple argument: if all professions are regulated, why should media be any different? Waging a turf battle against the electronic-media-appointed watchdog body headed by the former chief justice, J.S.Verma, Katju has strongly argued that the Press Council be transformed into a Media Council and assume the role of a regulator.
Katju, it would seem, had very definite ideas about editorial content and the hierarchy of news. In his perception, the media must play the role of social reformers and not fritter away their eagerness in frivolity and tittle-tattle, never mind the fact that not all their consumers are preoccupied with virtuousness. It is precisely because of his highbrow certitudes and disdain for popular journalism that his insistence on a media regulator has been viewed with a measure of amusement by the fourth estate.
If an all powerful regulator in the mould of Katju, it has been argued, assumed responsibility for the whole media, it would be tantamount to murdering diversity and ruining a vibrant and growing industry. In spelling out his philosophical preferences robustly, Katju unwittingly helped focus attention on the dangers posed by an activist regulator who would replicate the ideals of the so-called New Information Order, once favoured by the fellow travellers of the Soviet Union.

Whenever media is attacked, it invokes the spirit of people's inalienable right to know and largely succeeds in warding off the attack because

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The closure of the popular tabloid, News of the World, the arrest of the top executives of the Rupert Murdoch-run News International on phone hacking charges and the proceedings of the Leveson inquiry have focussed attention on the skewed internal workings of an otherwise vibrant British media. This has resulted in a bizarre turning of the tables. A readership accustomed to viewing the media as white knights in shining armour puncturing the pretensions of the powerful and the pompous has suddenly been exposed to unethical practices, blatant illegalities and the cosy relationship that exists between the fourth estate and politicians. 
The results have not been edifying. In the past, the media conducted themselves with the militant cussedness of trade unions. Every right was fiercely guarded and transformed into a privilege; every hint of regulation was instantly transformed into a larger battle for democracy; and the occasional statement on accountability was painted as an insidious assault on the people’s inalienable right to know.
The boot is now on the other foot. Instead of being assiduously wooed and flattered by the powerful, the Leveson inquiry has witnessed powerful media barons such as Rupert Murdoch and his son, James, being subjected to merciless interrogation. Indeed, as the inquiry meanders from the internal workings of the newsrooms to politics, the likes of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, are having a torrid time explaining their convivial relations with the Murdoch empire. Hostile public opinion is veering to the opinion that existing laws and quasi-official bodies such as the Press Complaints Commission aren’t enough. What the media need is a public-spirited, independent regulator.
It is difficult to gauge whether or not the chairman of Press Council, Markandey Katju, was influenced by developments in London when he rushed into battle against India’s ‘unionized’ media. A high-spirited individual with very definite (and occasionally bizarre) views on all subjects ranging from Salman Rushdie’s writings to cricket’s role as a promoter of false consciousness, the retired Supreme Court judge has proffered a simple argument: if all professions are regulated, why should media be any different? Waging a turf battle against the electronic-media-appointed watchdog body headed by the former chief justice, J.S.Verma, Katju has strongly argued that the Press Council be transformed into a Media Council and assume the role of a regulator.
Katju, it would seem, had very definite ideas about editorial content and the hierarchy of news. In his perception, the media must play the role of social reformers and not fritter away their eagerness in frivolity and tittle-tattle, never mind the fact that not all their consumers are preoccupied with virtuousness. It is precisely because of his highbrow certitudes and disdain for popular journalism that his insistence on a media regulator has been viewed with a measure of amusement by the fourth estate.
If an all powerful regulator in the mould of Katju, it has been argued, assumed responsibility for the whole media, it would be tantamount to murdering diversity and ruining a vibrant and growing industry. In spelling out his philosophical preferences robustly, Katju unwittingly helped focus attention on the dangers posed by an activist regulator who would replicate the ideals of the so-called New Information Order, once favoured by the fellow travellers of the Soviet Union.

What impact, in the author's perception, do aberrations like phone hacking have had on the otherwise vibrant British media?
(i) They have seriously dented the reputation of media.
(ii) They are symptomatic of a malaise that gives excuse to the forces that wish to trim the wings of the media.
(iii) They can have far-reaching consequences as it showed in England.

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The closure of the popular tabloid, News of the World, the arrest of the top executives of the Rupert Murdoch-run News International on phone hacking charges and the proceedings of the Leveson inquiry have focussed attention on the skewed internal workings of an otherwise vibrant British media. This has resulted in a bizarre turning of the tables. A readership accustomed to viewing the media as white knights in shining armour puncturing the pretensions of the powerful and the pompous has suddenly been exposed to unethical practices, blatant illegalities and the cosy relationship that exists between the fourth estate and politicians. 
The results have not been edifying. In the past, the media conducted themselves with the militant cussedness of trade unions. Every right was fiercely guarded and transformed into a privilege; every hint of regulation was instantly transformed into a larger battle for democracy; and the occasional statement on accountability was painted as an insidious assault on the people’s inalienable right to know.
The boot is now on the other foot. Instead of being assiduously wooed and flattered by the powerful, the Leveson inquiry has witnessed powerful media barons such as Rupert Murdoch and his son, James, being subjected to merciless interrogation. Indeed, as the inquiry meanders from the internal workings of the newsrooms to politics, the likes of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, are having a torrid time explaining their convivial relations with the Murdoch empire. Hostile public opinion is veering to the opinion that existing laws and quasi-official bodies such as the Press Complaints Commission aren’t enough. What the media need is a public-spirited, independent regulator.
It is difficult to gauge whether or not the chairman of Press Council, Markandey Katju, was influenced by developments in London when he rushed into battle against India’s ‘unionized’ media. A high-spirited individual with very definite (and occasionally bizarre) views on all subjects ranging from Salman Rushdie’s writings to cricket’s role as a promoter of false consciousness, the retired Supreme Court judge has proffered a simple argument: if all professions are regulated, why should media be any different? Waging a turf battle against the electronic-media-appointed watchdog body headed by the former chief justice, J.S.Verma, Katju has strongly argued that the Press Council be transformed into a Media Council and assume the role of a regulator.
Katju, it would seem, had very definite ideas about editorial content and the hierarchy of news. In his perception, the media must play the role of social reformers and not fritter away their eagerness in frivolity and tittle-tattle, never mind the fact that not all their consumers are preoccupied with virtuousness. It is precisely because of his highbrow certitudes and disdain for popular journalism that his insistence on a media regulator has been viewed with a measure of amusement by the fourth estate.
If an all powerful regulator in the mould of Katju, it has been argued, assumed responsibility for the whole media, it would be tantamount to murdering diversity and ruining a vibrant and growing industry. In spelling out his philosophical preferences robustly, Katju unwittingly helped focus attention on the dangers posed by an activist regulator who would replicate the ideals of the so-called New Information Order, once favoured by the fellow travellers of the Soviet Union.

How can media play its social role with devotion and caution so that there is not another Rupert Murdoch?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The closure of the popular tabloid, News of the World, the arrest of the top executives of the Rupert Murdoch-run News International on phone hacking charges and the proceedings of the Leveson inquiry have focussed attention on the skewed internal workings of an otherwise vibrant British media. This has resulted in a bizarre turning of the tables. A readership accustomed to viewing the media as white knights in shining armour puncturing the pretensions of the powerful and the pompous has suddenly been exposed to unethical practices, blatant illegalities and the cosy relationship that exists between the fourth estate and politicians. 
The results have not been edifying. In the past, the media conducted themselves with the militant cussedness of trade unions. Every right was fiercely guarded and transformed into a privilege; every hint of regulation was instantly transformed into a larger battle for democracy; and the occasional statement on accountability was painted as an insidious assault on the people’s inalienable right to know.
The boot is now on the other foot. Instead of being assiduously wooed and flattered by the powerful, the Leveson inquiry has witnessed powerful media barons such as Rupert Murdoch and his son, James, being subjected to merciless interrogation. Indeed, as the inquiry meanders from the internal workings of the newsrooms to politics, the likes of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, are having a torrid time explaining their convivial relations with the Murdoch empire. Hostile public opinion is veering to the opinion that existing laws and quasi-official bodies such as the Press Complaints Commission aren’t enough. What the media need is a public-spirited, independent regulator.
It is difficult to gauge whether or not the chairman of Press Council, Markandey Katju, was influenced by developments in London when he rushed into battle against India’s ‘unionized’ media. A high-spirited individual with very definite (and occasionally bizarre) views on all subjects ranging from Salman Rushdie’s writings to cricket’s role as a promoter of false consciousness, the retired Supreme Court judge has proffered a simple argument: if all professions are regulated, why should media be any different? Waging a turf battle against the electronic-media-appointed watchdog body headed by the former chief justice, J.S.Verma, Katju has strongly argued that the Press Council be transformed into a Media Council and assume the role of a regulator.
Katju, it would seem, had very definite ideas about editorial content and the hierarchy of news. In his perception, the media must play the role of social reformers and not fritter away their eagerness in frivolity and tittle-tattle, never mind the fact that not all their consumers are preoccupied with virtuousness. It is precisely because of his highbrow certitudes and disdain for popular journalism that his insistence on a media regulator has been viewed with a measure of amusement by the fourth estate.
If an all powerful regulator in the mould of Katju, it has been argued, assumed responsibility for the whole media, it would be tantamount to murdering diversity and ruining a vibrant and growing industry. In spelling out his philosophical preferences robustly, Katju unwittingly helped focus attention on the dangers posed by an activist regulator who would replicate the ideals of the so-called New Information Order, once favoured by the fellow travellers of the Soviet Union.

Why does William Price state that ‘our experience in trying to make United States dollars legal tender on Yap is somewhat humbling’?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The history of money and coins takes us back to when man first felt the need to exchange goods and services. Early palaeolithic man lived by hunting and fishing, sharing the flesh or fish obtained by the members of a group, each a self-sufficient unit in clash or conflict with neighbouring groups, from whom things of value could be had only through robbery or violence. With more peaceful forms of contact, trade began as simple barter of commodities; and gradually, instead of jealously guarding their resources, men began to go in search of products of other tribes and regions.

In India a form of barter of goods and services survived till recently in its jajmani system, where services rendered by members of hereditary castes of potters, carpenters, masons, weavers of goods, barbers, washer men, weavers, cooks, pundits and astrologers were traditionally paid for in kind—gram, oil, raw sugar, dairy products etc.But barter had its limitations: there had to be a simultaneous need to buy and sell and there had to be some standards of value. It therefore gave way, as the market place developed and widened choices, to a more precise way of using some durable products of intrinsic value. A seller could accept in exchange a product, which although he did not need to buy then, or not at all, could be used as a store of value and medium of exchange in the future.

Limestone money was in use in the Yap Islands till after the Second World War. Not cheap by current standards, a stone ‘a foot in diameter cost about seventy-five US dollars. A stone man-high was worth many villages and plantations, and a stone two-men high was beyond price’, according to William Price. He adds, ‘our experience in trying to make United States dollars legal tender on Yap is somewhat humbling. Yesterday it was the Japanese; today it is the Americans; tomorrow it could be somebody else.

Shells, particularly cowries, remained in universal use in Asia, China, Africa and Europe till not so long ago. In the Punjab, till the late 1920s, cowries valued at much less than a pice (sixty-four to a rupee) were sold by old women in markets from heaps piled in front of them as a subsidiary currency for marginal adjustment of prices. The cowry shell had a special value for rituals and ceremonies, for warding off the evil eye because of its resemblance to an eye, and a as a symbol of fertility and reproduction for its shape.

The passage is an exposition on

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The history of money and coins takes us back to when man first felt the need to exchange goods and services. Early palaeolithic man lived by hunting and fishing, sharing the flesh or fish obtained by the members of a group, each a self-sufficient unit in clash or conflict with neighbouring groups, from whom things of value could be had only through robbery or violence. With more peaceful forms of contact, trade began as simple barter of commodities; and gradually, instead of jealously guarding their resources, men began to go in search of products of other tribes and regions.

In India a form of barter of goods and services survived till recently in its jajmani system, where services rendered by members of hereditary castes of potters, carpenters, masons, weavers of goods, barbers, washer men, weavers, cooks, pundits and astrologers were traditionally paid for in kind—gram, oil, raw sugar, dairy products etc.But barter had its limitations: there had to be a simultaneous need to buy and sell and there had to be some standards of value. It therefore gave way, as the market place developed and widened choices, to a more precise way of using some durable products of intrinsic value. A seller could accept in exchange a product, which although he did not need to buy then, or not at all, could be used as a store of value and medium of exchange in the future.

Limestone money was in use in the Yap Islands till after the Second World War. Not cheap by current standards, a stone ‘a foot in diameter cost about seventy-five US dollars. A stone man-high was worth many villages and plantations, and a stone two-men high was beyond price’, according to William Price. He adds, ‘our experience in trying to make United States dollars legal tender on Yap is somewhat humbling. Yesterday it was the Japanese; today it is the Americans; tomorrow it could be somebody else.

Shells, particularly cowries, remained in universal use in Asia, China, Africa and Europe till not so long ago. In the Punjab, till the late 1920s, cowries valued at much less than a pice (sixty-four to a rupee) were sold by old women in markets from heaps piled in front of them as a subsidiary currency for marginal adjustment of prices. The cowry shell had a special value for rituals and ceremonies, for warding off the evil eye because of its resemblance to an eye, and a as a symbol of fertility and reproduction for its shape.

The author while talking about barter system in India refers to jajmani system. Besides highlighting the barter system prevalent in India, what else does this system convey?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The history of money and coins takes us back to when man first felt the need to exchange goods and services. Early palaeolithic man lived by hunting and fishing, sharing the flesh or fish obtained by the members of a group, each a self-sufficient unit in clash or conflict with neighbouring groups, from whom things of value could be had only through robbery or violence. With more peaceful forms of contact, trade began as simple barter of commodities; and gradually, instead of jealously guarding their resources, men began to go in search of products of other tribes and regions.

In India a form of barter of goods and services survived till recently in its jajmani system, where services rendered by members of hereditary castes of potters, carpenters, masons, weavers of goods, barbers, washer men, weavers, cooks, pundits and astrologers were traditionally paid for in kind—gram, oil, raw sugar, dairy products etc.But barter had its limitations: there had to be a simultaneous need to buy and sell and there had to be some standards of value. It therefore gave way, as the market place developed and widened choices, to a more precise way of using some durable products of intrinsic value. A seller could accept in exchange a product, which although he did not need to buy then, or not at all, could be used as a store of value and medium of exchange in the future.

Limestone money was in use in the Yap Islands till after the Second World War. Not cheap by current standards, a stone ‘a foot in diameter cost about seventy-five US dollars. A stone man-high was worth many villages and plantations, and a stone two-men high was beyond price’, according to William Price. He adds, ‘our experience in trying to make United States dollars legal tender on Yap is somewhat humbling. Yesterday it was the Japanese; today it is the Americans; tomorrow it could be somebody else.

Shells, particularly cowries, remained in universal use in Asia, China, Africa and Europe till not so long ago. In the Punjab, till the late 1920s, cowries valued at much less than a pice (sixty-four to a rupee) were sold by old women in markets from heaps piled in front of them as a subsidiary currency for marginal adjustment of prices. The cowry shell had a special value for rituals and ceremonies, for warding off the evil eye because of its resemblance to an eye, and a as a symbol of fertility and reproduction for its shape.

The passage records

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The history of money and coins takes us back to when man first felt the need to exchange goods and services. Early palaeolithic man lived by hunting and fishing, sharing the flesh or fish obtained by the members of a group, each a self-sufficient unit in clash or conflict with neighbouring groups, from whom things of value could be had only through robbery or violence. With more peaceful forms of contact, trade began as simple barter of commodities; and gradually, instead of jealously guarding their resources, men began to go in search of products of other tribes and regions.

In India a form of barter of goods and services survived till recently in its jajmani system, where services rendered by members of hereditary castes of potters, carpenters, masons, weavers of goods, barbers, washer men, weavers, cooks, pundits and astrologers were traditionally paid for in kind—gram, oil, raw sugar, dairy products etc.But barter had its limitations: there had to be a simultaneous need to buy and sell and there had to be some standards of value. It therefore gave way, as the market place developed and widened choices, to a more precise way of using some durable products of intrinsic value. A seller could accept in exchange a product, which although he did not need to buy then, or not at all, could be used as a store of value and medium of exchange in the future.

Limestone money was in use in the Yap Islands till after the Second World War. Not cheap by current standards, a stone ‘a foot in diameter cost about seventy-five US dollars. A stone man-high was worth many villages and plantations, and a stone two-men high was beyond price’, according to William Price. He adds, ‘our experience in trying to make United States dollars legal tender on Yap is somewhat humbling. Yesterday it was the Japanese; today it is the Americans; tomorrow it could be somebody else.

Shells, particularly cowries, remained in universal use in Asia, China, Africa and Europe till not so long ago. In the Punjab, till the late 1920s, cowries valued at much less than a pice (sixty-four to a rupee) were sold by old women in markets from heaps piled in front of them as a subsidiary currency for marginal adjustment of prices. The cowry shell had a special value for rituals and ceremonies, for warding off the evil eye because of its resemblance to an eye, and a as a symbol of fertility and reproduction for its shape.

Some of the following give forth many ingredients that define money. Which one of them can be taken as the chief ingredient?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

The history of money and coins takes us back to when man first felt the need to exchange goods and services. Early palaeolithic man lived by hunting and fishing, sharing the flesh or fish obtained by the members of a group, each a self-sufficient unit in clash or conflict with neighbouring groups, from whom things of value could be had only through robbery or violence. With more peaceful forms of contact, trade began as simple barter of commodities; and gradually, instead of jealously guarding their resources, men began to go in search of products of other tribes and regions.

In India a form of barter of goods and services survived till recently in its jajmani system, where services rendered by members of hereditary castes of potters, carpenters, masons, weavers of goods, barbers, washer men, weavers, cooks, pundits and astrologers were traditionally paid for in kind—gram, oil, raw sugar, dairy products etc.But barter had its limitations: there had to be a simultaneous need to buy and sell and there had to be some standards of value. It therefore gave way, as the market place developed and widened choices, to a more precise way of using some durable products of intrinsic value. A seller could accept in exchange a product, which although he did not need to buy then, or not at all, could be used as a store of value and medium of exchange in the future.

Limestone money was in use in the Yap Islands till after the Second World War. Not cheap by current standards, a stone ‘a foot in diameter cost about seventy-five US dollars. A stone man-high was worth many villages and plantations, and a stone two-men high was beyond price’, according to William Price. He adds, ‘our experience in trying to make United States dollars legal tender on Yap is somewhat humbling. Yesterday it was the Japanese; today it is the Americans; tomorrow it could be somebody else.

Shells, particularly cowries, remained in universal use in Asia, China, Africa and Europe till not so long ago. In the Punjab, till the late 1920s, cowries valued at much less than a pice (sixty-four to a rupee) were sold by old women in markets from heaps piled in front of them as a subsidiary currency for marginal adjustment of prices. The cowry shell had a special value for rituals and ceremonies, for warding off the evil eye because of its resemblance to an eye, and a as a symbol of fertility and reproduction for its shape.

The passage seems to suggest that the lurking fear of yore times has gone because

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

That India and the United States of America have different experiences with constitution making is not in doubt. The US initially came into being as a consequence of Individual states joining the Union in a voluntary federation. The Republic of India, despite being a nominal ‘Union of States’, evolved as the successor regime of British India (minus the parts that made up Pakistan). To this was added the many hundred princely states whose rulers signed the instrument of Accession and were effortlessly subsumed into the new republic. With the states being regarded as mere administrative units, there was a basis to B.R.Ambedkar’s assertion in the constituent assembly that the Constitution did not acknowledge any right of secession.

The constitutional denial of secession is worth reiterating if only to set at rest the uninformed fear that the recent political battles over federalism are a precursor to the weakening and eventual disintegration of Indian Union. Admittedly this was a lurking fear in the first two decades after independence but following the creation of a national market, the rise in inter-state mobility and the unifying effects of the media, film industries and cricket, the fear of India falling apart has virtually become a non-issue. It would be preposterous to suggest that those at the forefront of the demand to review centre-state relations harbour separatist ambitions. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the recent political strains between the non-Congress ruled states and the Centre have not been accompanied by sectarian strains involving local people and outsiders.

The movement for more equitable federal relations has undergone a profound change since the last years of Indira Gandhi’s government. In those days, much of the controversy centred on the powers of the governor and the partisan use of Article 356 to dismiss state governments. It was primarily these political concerns that led to the appointment of the Sarkaria Commission to review the whole gamut of centre-state relations.
While many states continue to be unhappy with the Centre’s de facto veto over state legislation, it would be fair to say that the debate has shifted to the more pressing issue of fiscal powers. What has triggered this debate is India’s economic growth: the rapid growth of the country’s gross domestic product since the process of liberalization began in 1991. In the recent years, the gross tax revenues of the country as a whole have increased exponentially.

The fundamental issue that the author raises and sets at rest in this passage pertains to

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

That India and the United States of America have different experiences with constitution making is not in doubt. The US initially came into being as a consequence of Individual states joining the Union in a voluntary federation. The Republic of India, despite being a nominal ‘Union of States’, evolved as the successor regime of British India (minus the parts that made up Pakistan). To this was added the many hundred princely states whose rulers signed the instrument of Accession and were effortlessly subsumed into the new republic. With the states being regarded as mere administrative units, there was a basis to B.R.Ambedkar’s assertion in the constituent assembly that the Constitution did not acknowledge any right of secession.

The constitutional denial of secession is worth reiterating if only to set at rest the uninformed fear that the recent political battles over federalism are a precursor to the weakening and eventual disintegration of Indian Union. Admittedly this was a lurking fear in the first two decades after independence but following the creation of a national market, the rise in inter-state mobility and the unifying effects of the media, film industries and cricket, the fear of India falling apart has virtually become a non-issue. It would be preposterous to suggest that those at the forefront of the demand to review centre-state relations harbour separatist ambitions. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the recent political strains between the non-Congress ruled states and the Centre have not been accompanied by sectarian strains involving local people and outsiders.

The movement for more equitable federal relations has undergone a profound change since the last years of Indira Gandhi’s government. In those days, much of the controversy centred on the powers of the governor and the partisan use of Article 356 to dismiss state governments. It was primarily these political concerns that led to the appointment of the Sarkaria Commission to review the whole gamut of centre-state relations.
While many states continue to be unhappy with the Centre’s de facto veto over state legislation, it would be fair to say that the debate has shifted to the more pressing issue of fiscal powers. What has triggered this debate is India’s economic growth: the rapid growth of the country’s gross domestic product since the process of liberalization began in 1991. In the recent years, the gross tax revenues of the country as a whole have increased exponentially.

How does the comparison between India and US with regard to experiences on constitution making help the author in presenting his case?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

That India and the United States of America have different experiences with constitution making is not in doubt. The US initially came into being as a consequence of Individual states joining the Union in a voluntary federation. The Republic of India, despite being a nominal ‘Union of States’, evolved as the successor regime of British India (minus the parts that made up Pakistan). To this was added the many hundred princely states whose rulers signed the instrument of Accession and were effortlessly subsumed into the new republic. With the states being regarded as mere administrative units, there was a basis to B.R.Ambedkar’s assertion in the constituent assembly that the Constitution did not acknowledge any right of secession.

The constitutional denial of secession is worth reiterating if only to set at rest the uninformed fear that the recent political battles over federalism are a precursor to the weakening and eventual disintegration of Indian Union. Admittedly this was a lurking fear in the first two decades after independence but following the creation of a national market, the rise in inter-state mobility and the unifying effects of the media, film industries and cricket, the fear of India falling apart has virtually become a non-issue. It would be preposterous to suggest that those at the forefront of the demand to review centre-state relations harbour separatist ambitions. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the recent political strains between the non-Congress ruled states and the Centre have not been accompanied by sectarian strains involving local people and outsiders.

The movement for more equitable federal relations has undergone a profound change since the last years of Indira Gandhi’s government. In those days, much of the controversy centred on the powers of the governor and the partisan use of Article 356 to dismiss state governments. It was primarily these political concerns that led to the appointment of the Sarkaria Commission to review the whole gamut of centre-state relations.
While many states continue to be unhappy with the Centre’s de facto veto over state legislation, it would be fair to say that the debate has shifted to the more pressing issue of fiscal powers. What has triggered this debate is India’s economic growth: the rapid growth of the country’s gross domestic product since the process of liberalization began in 1991. In the recent years, the gross tax revenues of the country as a whole have increased exponentially.

The author speaks about two fears: 'uninformed fear' and 'lurking fear'. Why these fears?

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

That India and the United States of America have different experiences with constitution making is not in doubt. The US initially came into being as a consequence of Individual states joining the Union in a voluntary federation. The Republic of India, despite being a nominal ‘Union of States’, evolved as the successor regime of British India (minus the parts that made up Pakistan). To this was added the many hundred princely states whose rulers signed the instrument of Accession and were effortlessly subsumed into the new republic. With the states being regarded as mere administrative units, there was a basis to B.R.Ambedkar’s assertion in the constituent assembly that the Constitution did not acknowledge any right of secession.

The constitutional denial of secession is worth reiterating if only to set at rest the uninformed fear that the recent political battles over federalism are a precursor to the weakening and eventual disintegration of Indian Union. Admittedly this was a lurking fear in the first two decades after independence but following the creation of a national market, the rise in inter-state mobility and the unifying effects of the media, film industries and cricket, the fear of India falling apart has virtually become a non-issue. It would be preposterous to suggest that those at the forefront of the demand to review centre-state relations harbour separatist ambitions. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the recent political strains between the non-Congress ruled states and the Centre have not been accompanied by sectarian strains involving local people and outsiders.

The movement for more equitable federal relations has undergone a profound change since the last years of Indira Gandhi’s government. In those days, much of the controversy centred on the powers of the governor and the partisan use of Article 356 to dismiss state governments. It was primarily these political concerns that led to the appointment of the Sarkaria Commission to review the whole gamut of centre-state relations.
While many states continue to be unhappy with the Centre’s de facto veto over state legislation, it would be fair to say that the debate has shifted to the more pressing issue of fiscal powers. What has triggered this debate is India’s economic growth: the rapid growth of the country’s gross domestic product since the process of liberalization began in 1991. In the recent years, the gross tax revenues of the country as a whole have increased exponentially.

The author uses the word 'preposterous' in the second paragraph of the passage. What impression does the word give about the intent of the author?
(a) The author is dismissive of any suggestion that those seeking review of centre-state relations harbour separatist ambition.
(b) The author condemns those who seek to secede from the union on the pretext of seeking more power for their states.
(c) The author sees demand for review of centre-state relation as a normal exercise and is highly critical and roundly dismissive of those trying to brand such demands as a ploy to seek secession.
(d) The author does not attach importance to those who are critical of those seeking improved power for their states.
(e) The author seems to pooh-pooh the efforts of those seeking more powers from the centre while actually working to a plan to seek to secede.

Directions: Answer the given question based on the following passage:

That India and the United States of America have different experiences with constitution making is not in doubt. The US initially came into being as a consequence of Individual states joining the Union in a voluntary federation. The Republic of India, despite being a nominal ‘Union of States’, evolved as the successor regime of British India (minus the parts that made up Pakistan). To this was added the many hundred princely states whose rulers signed the instrument of Accession and were effortlessly subsumed into the new republic. With the states being regarded as mere administrative units, there was a basis to B.R.Ambedkar’s assertion in the constituent assembly that the Constitution did not acknowledge any right of secession.

The constitutional denial of secession is worth reiterating if only to set at rest the uninformed fear that the recent political battles over federalism are a precursor to the weakening and eventual disintegration of Indian Union. Admittedly this was a lurking fear in the first two decades after independence but following the creation of a national market, the rise in inter-state mobility and the unifying effects of the media, film industries and cricket, the fear of India falling apart has virtually become a non-issue. It would be preposterous to suggest that those at the forefront of the demand to review centre-state relations harbour separatist ambitions. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the recent political strains between the non-Congress ruled states and the Centre have not been accompanied by sectarian strains involving local people and outsiders.

The movement for more equitable federal relations has undergone a profound change since the last years of Indira Gandhi’s government. In those days, much of the controversy centred on the powers of the governor and the partisan use of Article 356 to dismiss state governments. It was primarily these political concerns that led to the appointment of the Sarkaria Commission to review the whole gamut of centre-state relations.
While many states continue to be unhappy with the Centre’s de facto veto over state legislation, it would be fair to say that the debate has shifted to the more pressing issue of fiscal powers. What has triggered this debate is India’s economic growth: the rapid growth of the country’s gross domestic product since the process of liberalization began in 1991. In the recent years, the gross tax revenues of the country as a whole have increased exponentially.